I was glad to be asked to speak about my teacher’s contributions in theory of value and theoretical ethics because I heard some of his more recent lectures under these titles and because his influence on me has been greatest through those lectures. However, since there is not sufficient time on this occasion for a balanced survey of Dorion Cairns’s results in axiology and ethics, I shall emphasize his descriptive work on the affective and conative, which is the foundation of those normative disciplines. Let me begin somewhat historically.

What Husserl called intentional Erlebnisse—a phrase Cairns finally came to translate as “mental processes”—Brentano had called psychischen Phänomene and had classified into Vorstellungen, Urteilen and Phänomene der Liebe und des Hasses. Husserl criticized this classification and, in effect, replaced it with another three-fold division where the class of doxic mental processes replaced Brentano’s class of Urteilen and included the Vorstellungen as neutrality modifications of simple believings; and where the Phänomene der Liebe und des Hasses were divided into two classes, those of the emotional and the volitional mental processes.

Cairns adopted the distinction between the doxic and the non-doxic from Husserl. My notes on his lectures contain the repeated complaint, however, that he could find no principle by which to divide the non-doxic exhaustively, for while the emotional and volitional processes belonged to the distinct classes of the affective and the conative, wishings did not belong to either of those classes. Yet Cairns did not offer a phenomenology of wishings; instead he confined himself to the non-doxic processes of the affect and conative sorts.
There are three main respects in which Cairns was conscious of having progressed beyond Husserl on the affective and conative. In the first place, he rejected Husserl’s contention that there are sensuous data involved in liking and in striving similar to the “hyletic data” alleged by Husserl to be involved in perception; he rejected this contention because he looked for such data and they were not there. In the second place, Husserl believed that there were mental processes which simply lacked non-doxic strata. In contrast, Cairns contended that in the cases Husserl had in mind that are non-doxic strata, but they are thetically neutral. Thus while Cairns habitually spoke of doxic, affective, and conative mental processes, he repeatedly took pains to point out that this was merely a matter of calling concrete processes with thetic strata of all three sorts after the predominating stratum. In the third place, Cairns emphatically distinguished between the aktiv or “actional” and the passiv or “automatic” mental processes in the non-doxic spheres where Husserl did not, because, according to Cairns, the difference in question was recognized by him too late for him to adjust his concepts.

Let us now consider Cairns’s work on the affective and conative in a systematic perspective. Where method is concerned, there are three points worthy of note. In the first place, Cairns presented mainly phenomenological-psychological results in his lectures because his goal in teaching was to lead students to see the things described and phenomenological-psychological results are comparatively easy to verify. Nevertheless, he also claimed that all such results could be reinterpreted as contents of transcendental phenomenology. In the second place, Cairns reflectively described mental processes first and foremost, paying only secondary attention to the objective sense, manners of givenness, and the thetic statuses of the things intended to by such processes. By virtue of this emphasis, we can call Cairns—in contrast to Gurwitsch, for example—a “noetic phenomenologist.” In the third place, Cairns employed what he called a “parallelizing” approach where the investigation of the affective and the conative is concerned. That is to say, he took the account of the doxic which he had adapted from Husserl and looked for similarities and differences in the non-doxic spheres.

Turning now from Cairns’s approach to his results, I find in my notes that he fruitfully compared affective and conative mental processes with the doxic in seven important respects:

1. All affective and conative mental processes are intiative to things; they are likings or strivings and as such have things which are liked or striven toward in them. There can be likenings which are intiative to ideal