Weighing the topic of this symposium, I have come to hope that Dorion Cairns's contribution to phenomenology has not yet arrived, not fully arrived in any event. To date, the effects of Cairns's work, so far as they are observable, are by no means commensurate with what his contribution might and should be. A direct impact of his thought on the phenomenological movement as a whole is discernable only in a few of his closer students. The course of phenomenology in North America during the 1950's and most of the 1960's was a disoriented, meandering sort of movement, accompanied by nervous ticks and, all too often, meaningless babble: something Cairns's students could not witness without a sense of frustration over his relative silence. Those who were familiar with them saw that Cairns's acuteness, accuracy, precision and his sense of direction, his accord with the spirit of phenomenology as a strict science, were precisely what the movement lacked. It is still somewhat impoverished in respect of this need, not quite moderately well off. Cairns's contribution—as I said before—has, I hope, yet to arrive.

So what I shall speak to here is a somewhat reduced version of my topic. The residuum from this reduction is: some of the features most significant for phenomenology of Dorion Cairns's conception of intentionality. In this version of the topic, I mean to avoid suggesting that these features have been actually contributed to the phenomenological movement as a whole or, if they have been, that they have been accepted or even recognized by the movement as a whole.

Most of what follows is based on notes taken by myself and others in Cairns's course "Husserl's Theory of Intentionality." The extension of
Cairns's basic insight concerning the nature of intentionality to the conception of phenomenology stated by Husserl in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* is my own though I consider it to be simply an extension.

What Cairns expressed by the word "intentionality" he thought of as a primitive concept, not strictly definable. As he used it, "intentionality" is either a common name or a proper name. As a common name, it stands for individual properties; each such property belongs to a mental process. As a proper name, it stands for a generic universal, one that is exemplified in each and every mental process by the individual intentionality of that process. This indicates a departure from the denotation of the term as it had been used by Husserl. For Cairns, this departure from Husserl was a relatively late development, dating from around 1967 or even later. His lectures before 1967 indicate acceptance of Husserl's view of the flow of hyletic data as a nonintentive component within the stream of mental life.

The individual intentionality of a mental process is inherent in the process itself. Its individual intentionality is better thought of as a qualitative property of the process rather than as a relational property. For the intentionality of a tree-seeing or a glue-smelling or a granny-remembering does not require that any tree or any glue or any granny exist or have existed—a tree and some glue and a granny being the intended objects of the respective mental processes. Any real relation on the other hand (such as cause to effect or contiguity in space or time) would require the real existence of the terms of the relation. Intentionality, however, does not require the real existence of the intended object. Although he used the terms "intentionality" and "intentiveness" synonymously, Cairns preferred the latter, precisely because it seems better to express the qualitative character of the property referred to.

By properly emphasizing the qualitative character of intentiveness, certain misunderstandings and criticisms of phenomenology can be mitigated. Husserl thinks of intentionality as a distinguishing character of all mental life. If one also thinks of intentionality as a relation then even the notion of psychological reduction is liable understandably to appear somewhat ridiculous. After all, the phenomenologist proposes by means of the époché to isolate his mental life purely as such for reflective observation. This époché involves disregarding any beliefs—and even any knowledge—the observer might have concerning the real relations between this mental life and other entities. The époché would then involve disregarding intentionality itself if this were considered a real relation.