In his Introduction to Volume III of Schutz's _Collected Papers_, Gurwitsch writes: "It would be of interest to compare Schutz's analysis of conduct in everyday life... with Heidegger's interpretation of the anonymity of 'das Man,' in _Sein und Zeit._"¹ It is not my intention to carry out such a comparison here. Rather, what concerns me for the present is the concept of anonymity itself, largely freed of its placement in Heidegger's thought and considered speculatively in the context of the work of Gurwitsch and Schutz. On the surface, it would appear that there is a much stronger case to be made out for Schutz's closeness to the theme of anonymity than that of Gurwitsch. The point of my remarks will be to suggest that a more cautious appraisal of Gurwitsch's ideas may well reveal a sympathy for the problem as a feature of the more generalized issue of abstraction. But before very much can be profitably said, it is necessary to ask in what sense anonymity is a philosophical problem. Here Heidegger offers at least a point of departure.

Anonymity, in Heidegger's terms, is the inauthenticity of everydayness. "Everyone," he writes, "is the other, and no one is himself. The 'they' which supplies the answer to the question of the 'who' of everyday Dasein, is the 'nobody' to whom every Dasein has already surrendered itself in Being-among-one-another."² In these terms, Dasein is seized by and dis-

persed in anonymity. Everydayness takes on the character of the "they" and loses itself in a publicness in which the "I" is dormant or hidden. From this account, it would appear that the anonymous thrives on the failure of the self to penetrate the disguises of mundanity. The very familiarity the self has with itself—its current of being—is rooted in Otherness, in alterity. Heidegger writes: "The Self of everyday Dasein is the they-self, which we distinguish from the authentic Self—that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way.... As they-self, the particular Dasein has been dispersed into the 'they,' and must first find itself. This dispersal characterizes the 'subject' of that kind of Being which we know as concernful absorption in the world we encounter as closest to us. If Dasein is familiar with itself as they-self, this means at the same time that the 'they' itself prescribes that way of interpreting the world and Being-in-the-world which lies closest."

In Heidegger's account, then, the problem of anonymity consists in the distancing of the self from its authentic possibilities. The discussion is geared to a conception of death and a translation of temporality as the clues to a new resoluteness of Dasein. What commenced, in some ways, with a structural examination of inauthentic Dasein, concludes with a refusal of the familiar. Anonymity proves to be the sin of mundanity. But let it be immediately said that it is possible to provide a structural analysis of mundane existence which does not depend on Heidegger's version of authenticity. In fact, interpreting social reality as grounded in anonymity in no way commits the analyst to Heidegger's views. To the contrary, Schutz's critique of the natural attitude is, if anything, a celebration of the typically anonymous character of everydayness and a reconstruction of its meaning for a science of social reality. For present purposes, let us look at Schutz through Gurwitsch's eyes.

As Gurwitsch reads Schutz—and I agree with that reading—the notions of "stock of knowledge at hand," the "reciprocity of perspectives," and the large claim that knowledge is socially rooted are the elements of an analysis of intersubjectivity. As Gurwitsch expresses it: "The world of our common-sense experience and daily life is an interpreted world, having sense and meaning for us; and as thus interpreted it is taken for granted. Its interpretation is socially derived, and this holds not only for the bulk of the content and detail of the interpretation but also, and chiefly, for its

\[3\] Ibid., p. 167.
\[4\] Gurwitsch, in Schutz, op. cit., p. xxii.