reason and logic, and through negotiation the German dictator could be appeased since Moscow now was ready to do anything economically to gain time and avert war. However, we know now that Hitler was motivated by emotion, prejudice, and intuition. At the beginning of the Pact, Stalin had stated to Nikita Khrushchev, "I know what Hitler's up to. He thinks he's outsmarted me, but actually it is I who have outsmarted him." (p. 291) Stalin was tragically wrong and the Soviet Union paid the price.

The Deadly Embrace is a coherent, organized, and readable account of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. This book is a welcome addition to the corpus of material on Russian-German relations, as well as to the body of material covering the origins of World War II. Not withstanding its general value, this work does have some problems. There is the over-reliance upon Western and German sources and a corresponding paucity of Soviet accounts. Another problem is the relative neglect of policy formation or implementation by the important personal secretariat of Stalin. This lack of definition from the Russian viewpoint is unavoidable given the relative scarcity of Soviet sources for the period. We may hope that recent Soviet willingness to release more historical documentary material will continue. For the present, however, The Deadly Embrace stands as a well-written, generally reliable, single-volume study of the Nazi-Soviet Pact.

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In 1982, Alexander Nekrich wrote in his book Utopia in Power (vol. 2, page 149): "Among the most complicated problems of the history of the USSR during the Second World War, if not the most complicated and in addition forbidden to Soviet historians, is the question of the collaboration of Soviet citizens with the enemy."

This comment has a wider application as the subject presents difficulties for the Western historian as well. Archival material is incomplete and scattered throughout a number of libraries and archival collections in the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany. More importantly, the question of the opposition to Stalin during World War II is an emotive one. Historical analysis swiftly gives way to the wider arena of political and moral judgments. It is easy to assume that the struggle between good and evil was clear-cut. As a result, the motives of those Soviet citizens who hoped that the war might present an opportunity to bring about radical change in the USSR are frequently misunderstood.

On the basis of extensive research in German archives, Hoffmann has produced a detailed study of the so-called Vlasov Army. He concentrates on the period after the publication of the Prague Manifesto on November 14, 1944. This signalled a change in Nazi policy and Vlasov was allowed to form military units under his command. Until then, Lt-Gen. A. A. Vlasov's leadership of the Russian Liberation Army had been fictitious: merely a German propaganda exercise. The attempts to persuade the Nazi authorities to alter their policy with respect to the USSR and to create an independent Russian force had been unsuccessful. In 1944 Himmler finally met Vlasov and agreed to the formation of KONR (the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of
Russia) and the creation of VS KONR (the KONR armed forces) under Vlasov's direct control.

Hoffmann provides an exhaustive survey of the organization of Vlasov's land and air forces and details of their military engagements, their disbandment and eventual capture by the Red Army or later repatriation to the USSR. Hoffmann also scrutinises the views of the adherents and examines the Soviet response to this new form of grass roots opposition.

He is adamant that the Russian Liberation Movement was free from Nazi taint. Ideological statements confirm this. Vlasov is supposed to have told Himmler that Russians could not accept the Untermenschen theory. When Himmler demanded that the Prague Manifesto should include criticism of the Jews, Vlasov rejected this and the Manifesto contains no mention of the Jewish question. The KONR newspaper Volia Naroda published between November 1944 and April 1945 contains no anti-Semitic references. On the military side there was also a great deal of friction. The Russian commanders were trying to conserve their men in order to create a united anti-Communist unit. The German commanders wanted additional reserves for the defence of the front.

Hoffmann argues forcefully that the importance of the Russian Liberation Movement must be understood within a political framework provided by the attitudes of the Soviet authorities toward the anti-Stalinist Russians. In this, he agrees with the views of many adherents of the movement. Hitherto, historians have tended to examine the opposition within the German context as an illustration of the pressures on policy makers.

The Soviet government saw their own prisoners-of-war as traitors. Consequently, it deprived them and their families of state aid and protection. German officers, concerned by the appalling conditions in the prisoner-of-war camps, were unable to do anything since the Soviet refusal to sign the Geneva Convention gave the Nazis a free rein. In chapter 5, Hoffmann argues that the Soviet attitude, whereby the lives of their soldiers, whether in the front line or in prisoner-of-war camp, were expendable, was crucial in persuading Soviet citizens to align themselves with Vlasov.

Some of Hoffmann's most interesting and most controversial hypotheses relate to the continuing appeal of the Russian Liberation Movement even in the later stages of the war. Hoffmann considers that one ought not be too deterministic about the outcome of hostilities. It is usually argued that by 1944 KONR had no chance of success because it was clear that the Red Army was winning. Morale within the USSR had changed from the defeatist mood of the first months of the war. The areas of the USSR which had been under Nazi control had been reoccupied by Soviet forces. The population of those areas was no longer available to support any initiatives made by the Liberation Movement. Some of Vlasov's subordinates hoped that they might be able to improve their tragic situation. Vlasov himself, however, is supposed to have said that all that could be done was to leave a record of their aims and intentions to show that they had opposed the Stalinist regime from patriotic motives and had not supported Nazi policy. Hoffmann, however, draws a parallel between attitudes found in the armies of Alexander I and the Red Army. The officers of Alexander's victorious armies were shocked by the contrast between their own country and the West. This fuelled the disaffection which led to the Decembrist rising in 1825. Hoffmann asks (p. 28) whether a similar reaction might not have been found amongst the ranks of the Red Army? There were, indeed, individual instances of desertion from the Red Army to Vlasov's forces as late as the spring of 1945 but little evidence for widespread unrest. I have not come across evidence that Vlasov's supporters had any great hopes of change...