In the past, national histories have been mostly the work of historians from the nation in question—"insiders", one might say. The history of France has been largely the work of French savants; the history of Germany mostly the work of German Gelehrte. They know the language, culture and usually the archives best. They usually create the research paradigms, or at least mediate demands from elsewhere that lead to the creation of those paradigms. At the same time, there has often been a useful role for "outsiders", who have frequently challenged the national establishment on issues and in ways that the dominant group might prefer to ignore. Élie Halévy played a useful part in creating the historiography of modern England. English-speaking historians have argued fruitfully with German-speaking ones over the course of German history since Bismarck.

The latter example suggests that the relationship between the insiders and the outsiders can become an adversarial one. There was a contest between the older generation of German historians and a group of foreigners for hegemony over German history. It did, of course, take two world wars and the attendant issues to bring about such a bitter confrontation between insiders and outsiders.

The German example notwithstanding, I know of no other case where the differences between insiders and outsiders have been so deep, the contest so bitter, as that between Soviet and non-Soviet scholars—predominantly Americans—over how Russian history should be written. That contest has been going on for more than forty years, although its bitterness has dramatically diminished in the last two years. The political developments of the present time give us hope that many wounds may be healed and divisions overcome in the coming generation, among them, perhaps, the struggle between insiders and outsiders over Russian history.

But creating a single historiography instead of two, even during the era of glasnost' and perestroika will not be easy. Methodological issues and issues of historical culture, still divide the two communities. As Soviet scholars have been increasingly willing to accept an ideal of "objectivity" in historiography, they have come to see that this is not entirely possible. The experiences of the past have shown that even when the best of intentions are pursued, there are limits to what can be achieved.
cal inquiry (rather than excoriating it as "bourgeois)", American scholars have found the possibility of objectivity much more problematical. Perhaps even more serious, the histories of the Soviet historical profession and the American have been very different and may be diverging in new ways even now. Americans have moved away from institutional history in recent years and show little sign of re-interesting themselves in it. And one may guess that the ideas and the intellectual circles of late Imperial Russia will continue to be more interesting to Soviet scholars than its state institutions. Still, the recurrent efforts to construct what is now universally referred to as civil society" links the turn of the 1990s with what non-Soviet scholars still call the era of the "Great Reforms."

American historians began to devote themselves to the serious study of Russian history only at the outset of the Cold War, and what they produced was much conditioned by it. It was first of all the enormous task of explaining the Russian Revolution that engaged these novice historians of modern Russia—liberals, conservatives, and a few radicals. The work produced was of an extremely varied quality, but just as Soviet historians were attempting to work out "how it had happened," so that they could make their version hegemonic, Western historians began to construct counter-versions of how it had really happened. Whether their starting points were liberal, conservative-conspiratorial, Freudian, or non-Party Marxist, the fact of the Cold War powerfully and sometimes subtly pressured them toward common views. As they became engaged in this task, they tended to leap frog back over work done in the Soviet period and base themselves on the populist-tinged liberal historiography of the the late Imperial period that had devoted so much attention to the struggle against the tsarist regime. Serious study of Russian history in the United States was insignificant until after 1945, but at that point, young American and émigré historians began to familiarize themselves with the historiography of late Imperial Russia. As they set out to investigate the opposition to the Old Regime, which led to the Revolution, they steeped themselves in the work of historians like V. I. Semevskii, A. I. Pypin and A. A. Kornilov. Studies of radicalism and the revolutionary movement soon came to dominate European and especially American historiography and continued to do so until very recently.

In the last two decades, American and to a lesser extent German scholarship has finally turned its attention toward the institutions and personnel of

unconditionally negative attitude toward honest, objectivist-minded, non-Marxist researchers is not justified, nor is the relegation of their works to the category of pseudo-scholarship." (174)