"There where the French army will be, there too will be the army of Romania," declared King Carol in 1935 on the occasion of a ceremony in Paris when he was awarded the Médaille Militaire.

More recently still, on October 16, 1937, speaking at a banquet marking the end of the Romanian military maneuvers, at which General Gamelin assisted, he had addressed the French Chief of Staff in the following words: "You will leave us with the knowledge that you have seen, not an allied army on paper, but an army upon which you can count."

Furthermore, barely three weeks before calling Goga to power, he had taken great pains to give the warmest of welcomes to Delbos, who, in the course of a trip that had taken him to Warsaw, Belgrade, and Prague, paid an official visit to Bucarest.

Carol, in his levity, failed to realize that the fact of entrusting the power to a party, certain of whose leaders were known to be on intimate terms with the top Nazis, would rouse such a storm of indignant stupefaction throughout the West, and especially in France, where this seemed a lamentably ill-chosen reply to the gesture of friendship embodied in the visit of the French Foreign
Minister. He had imagined that he could make use of Goga for his own political ends at home, while maintaining, through personal control, the political line of the past in foreign affairs. Misled by the flattery of his own intimates, he believed that he inspired so much confidence in London, in Paris, and in Geneva, that his personal credit would see him through.

In accordance with the King's instructions, Micescu, the new Foreign Minister, made a categorical statement upon assuming his post. "We shall," he said, "maintain intact all existing alliances and friendships... We are not thinking of changing in any way our prior commitments."

Carol asked him to pass through Prague and Belgrade on his way to Geneva where he was to represent Romania at the January session of the Council of the League of Nations. As I accompanied him on these trips, I was able to see the Micescu really sought to reduce so far as he could the deplorable effect of Goga's nomination, and to give assurances that our former line of foreign policy would not be changed. But facts are ever more potent than words. Developments inside Romania could not stand us in good stead abroad.

In Geneva Micescu found himself on the carpet. Two powerful international Jewish organizations, the Executive Committee of the Jewish World Congress of London and the Federation of Jewish Societies of France, had petitioned the League of Nations to investigate the situation in Romania.

Romania, like Poland, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, was a signatory of a treaty for the protection of minorities. This gave the Council of the League of Nations the right to deal with anything concerning the treatment by Romania of all minorities of race, creed, or language. According to the text of the Treaty, and to the subsequently adopted procedure, all complaints were brought to the attention of the implicated government. The latter, within a delay of two months, had to present its observations, and the affair then came before the Council. Here it was sufficient for a single member to opine that the stipulations of the Treaty had been violated to send the suit before the Permanent Court of International Justice, whose decision was final.

In case of grave violation, the Council could adopt an urgency procedure, examining the case without waiting for the delay of two months to go by until the presentation of remarks.

Micescu realized immediately that the affair was most serious and that there was no chance whatever to wriggle through the