Modern Greek history between 1961 and 1967 has, on the whole, become a battlefield where civilians have armed themselves as hoplites, peltasts, auxiliary and untrained troops to participate actively in the battle. It is a period rich in events, yet in contrast dominated by interpretations which frequently have the tendency to emphasize the politically "mysterious and occult." This state of affairs has tended to permit and even to encourage what historians call the "conspiracy theory," that is to say: "Historical events happen because someone planned that they should happen. The persons involved in the planning of these events are 'sinister' people, while the others, on the other side of the fence, are innocent victims of this conspiracy." The plans and counter-plans filled the pages of a great number of books and innumerable articles that saw the light during the last decade with such goings-on that many readers ceased to be receptive to the still small voice recalling them to the full implications of the evidence. It is the purpose of this article to concentrate on one aspect of this period, the relations of the palace and the politicians, and to make as little as possible of the "conspiracy" idea.

A point or two needs to be added here for the sake of clarification. This study is not a comprehensive examination of the period from 1961 to 1967. Such an undertaking would be impossible in an article of this size. Moreover, the absence of any reference to several of the accomplishments of the Papandreou era—real or apparent—should not be interpreted as an effort to minimize them. Several of Papandreou's political accomplishments and the important question of "political tone" are significant subjects in the history of modern Greek politics, and someday, when Greek emotions will have cooled off, Papandreou's political tone and his concrete achievements may be evaluated objectively.

Further, the conservative-leftish or conservative-liberal-leftish, if you wish, schema is purposely avoided here, although it would have helped as an organizational technique. But how true these conventional labels are when applied to Greek politics is not as simple a matter to decide. Beyond the political orientation that these labels may or may not connote, they have often been distorted to imply moral attributes (conservative bad, leftist good, or vice versa).

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something that intensifies the normally excited tone of Greek politics and confuses the issues. This article will therefore deal with a small number of political-constitutional points and will treat them as a case-analysis from which, hopefully, some conclusions may be reached.

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The course of history that culminated in the military coup of 21 April 1967, produced several important political by-products, some positive, others negative. One of these was the 'Ανεκδότος 'Αγών, "unyielding struggle," used as a catchy slogan and popularized as an issue by George Papandreou after the election of 1961.

The "unyielding struggle" consists of at least two phases which are separated by the short interlude of the two Center Union Party governments from November, 1963 to July, 1965. The motives that precipitated the "unyielding struggle" are diverse; they are going to be diversified further in the second phase. For the first time, after a number of years, the kaleidoscopic collection of little parties and individuals who had posed as the opposition to the ERE (the Radical Union of Karamanlis) were now unified. George Papandreou was chosen as the leader of the Center Union because of his age, experience, and his oratorical talent. Curiously enough, just before the formation of the Center Union, Papandreou was in contact with the Radical Union of Karamanlis, ready and willing to make a political alliance.1

The parties which formed the Center Union had not been in the government since 1952 and had begun to feel ostracized from the center of the political scene. They united in 1961 in the hope that unity would bring them victory. Their hopes were dashed by the election results. This in itself was sufficient to generate the frustration which approached the border of passion. The issue through which they expressed their frustration revolved around the special circumstances under which the elections of 1961 were held. The night

1. There were at least ten groupings that claimed for themselves the title of party, though several of them had a very limited following. The ten are: The Liberal Party, of Sophocles Venizelos; the Liberal Democratic Party, of George Papandreou; the Progressive Party, of S. Markezinis; the Populist Social Party, of Stephanos Stephanopoulos; the National Progressive Union of S. Papapolitis; the Progressive Farmers' Movement, of P. Katsotas; the New Political Movement, of Athenassiadis-Novas; the Democratic Party, of S. Allamanis; the Socialist Party, of E. Tsirimokos; and the Agrarian Party of A. Baltatzis. For the negotiations of G. Papandreou with Karamanlis, see St. Stephanopoulos, Καθημερινή, 18 Aug. 1965, p. 1; E. Tsirimokos, Βήμα, 18 Aug. 1965; p. 1. Of greater interest are perhaps the details of Makris, a member of the ERE, about this incident, Καθημερινή, 1 Dec. 1965, p. 1; C. Metsotakis, 'Αναζήτημα τών φάκελο τῆς 'Αποστασίας τοῦ 1965, Επίκαιρα, 24-31 June 1976, p. 30.