THOUGH WICKHAM STEAD ONCE WROTE THAT THE TRUE STORY OF THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE WOULD NEVER BE WRITTEN, THE LITERATURE ON THIS FATEFUL EVENT IS SO TREMENDOUS THAT IT COULD IN ITSELF BE THE OBJECT OF A GREAT DEAL OF HISTORIOGRAPHIC RESEARCH. TO THE UNITED STATES AND BULGARIA, THIS CONFERENCE HELD A SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE. TO THE FORMER IT MEANT A DECISIVE THOUGH NOT VERY SUCCESSFUL INITIAL ENTRY INTO A SYSTEM OF RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE REST OF THE GREAT POWERS, WHILE TO BULGARIA IT MARKED THE FINAL STAGE IN THE ADVERSE ADJUSTMENT OF HER TERRITORY THAT PUT A LASTING IMPRINT ON HER POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AS A NATION AND A STATE.


IT IS HARDLY NECESSARY TO SHOW HOW ESSENTIAL IT IS TO ARGUE IN FAVOR OF AN EXAMINATION OF THE UNITED STATES' ATTITUDE TOWARD THE BULGARIAN TERRITORIAL PROBLEM. THERE IS NO BOOK ON THE SUBJECT WHICH DOES NOT MENTION, EVEN IF JUST IN

passing, the special relationship between the two countries during the war and at the conference itself. Bulgarian historiography today has also done much to satisfy the interest in our country on this subject. Though its research could hardly be considered exhaustive, there already are at hand the successful beginnings of a scientific explanation in all its aspects of the phenomenon of the United States and Bulgaria at the Paris Peace Conference. The works of such prestigious Bulgarian historians as H. Hristov and V. Bozhinov, as well as of young P. Petkov⁶ offer convincing antitheses to the widespread belief in the charitable motives and moral aspects of the American attitude concerning the Bulgarian question in 1919 in Paris. H. Hristov explains the benevolent attitude of the United States toward Bulgaria by the long-range anti-Soviet plans of that country in postwar Europe and by the notions of American diplomacy about an international state in the area of the Straits with its center in Constantinople. V. Bozhinov looks for the long-term intentions of that country to gain influence in Bulgaria in the wake of the war. P. Petkov assumes that the United States had wanted to create a big and strong state as a counter-weight to the Anglo-French influence in Europe. Irrespective of the various shades of opinion and preferences in the works of these authors, they are of the same mind with their American colleagues that the United States was the only country in Paris to take up Bulgaria's defense. This conditional defense had to do with the question of utmost importance to the Bulgarians, the territorial one, and this is the reason our efforts here will be concentrated on this aspect alone.

Proceeding from the above-mentioned accurate findings and inferences of the authors in question, we shall try in the present article to define other reasons for the United States' attitude, to look for the interrelationship between arguments of an ethnic nature and the political realities, between intentions and possibilities, between moral motivations and self-interests, and between public opinion and government considerations in the United States policy on the Bulgarian territorial question at the Paris Peace Conference. Without assuming that the problem could be exhaustively discussed in a paper of the present size, we shall try to emphasize some essential aspects which, in our opinion, need to be taken up in more detail than others which have already been scientifically clarified in our country.

Quite a number of authors in other countries freely use such expressions as “Bulgarophilism,” “the Bulgarian myth,” “a considerable pro-Bulgarian sentiment,” and the like when speaking about the place which Bulgaria occupied

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