Kieran Setiya's previous book, *Reasons Without Rationalism* (Princeton University Press, 2007), argued elegantly for a kind of internal connection between ethical virtues and reasons for action. But even if successful the argument leaves moral skeptics unfazed, for the skeptic can simply doubt that any ethical virtues, so conceived, exist. (By analogy, a moral error theorist may accept that the term “murder” analytically denotes *morally wrongful killing*, but then simply denies that any killings count, strictly speaking, as murders.) *Knowing Right from Wrong* aspires to remedy this limitation with fresh anti-skeptical argumentation. It is a short book with just four substantive chapters aimed at establishing the possibility of moral knowledge.

The first addresses moral disagreement. Setiya accepts that parties can fundamentally disagree on moral matters. According to what he calls “the Equal Weight View,” one's confidence in \( p \) should fade upon encountering a dissenting epistemic peer if one's prior conditional credence in \( p \) is low (where “prior” means prior to thinking things through and knowing what one's peers think about \( p \), and “conditional” means conditional on what one has learned about the circumstances of disagreement). One way of avoiding moral skepticism in the face of peer disagreement would thus be to insist that one's prior conditional credence on moral matters can be high. But this is not Setiya's strategy; he prefers to reject the Equal Weight View altogether. He does so by protesting that the principle unduly nullifies the evidence one may hold in favor of one's moral judgment. If you and I are both trained meteorologists and have consulted the same evidence, and I come to the conclusion that it will definitely rain tomorrow and you (to my surprise) do not, then if as a matter of fact the evidence supports my view, then my credence should remain high. Even though from your perspective it is I who have surprisingly come to an erroneous meteorological opinion, evidence is an objective matter not determined by how it seems to us. The situation, says Setiya, is “enduringly asymmetric” (22).

Given this strategy, Setiya is forced to address the question for the moral case: What kind of evidence do we have for our moral judgments? If there really isn't anything that counts as evidence for moral views, then the anti-skeptical strategy just outlined comes to naught. Hence Setiya embarks on a critical examination of certain theories of moral evidence: intuitionism, coherentism, reflective equilibrium. His positive thesis is that one can have justified moral beliefs on the basis of non-ethical evidence: “What is the evidence by which I am justified in believing that an act is right or wrong, an agent
generous or unjust? It is evidence that the act or agent falls under non-ethical concepts, $N$, where, necessarily, what falls under $N$ is right or wrong, generous or unjust” (49). A person who encounters a sincere moral dissenter need not be epistemically shaken in her moral judgments so long as her beliefs are “in the right [and] not only true but what the evidence supports” (52).

This is where things stand at the end of chapter 1 (which is about a third of the way through the book). And it should be pretty clear that at this stage the skeptic is more likely to be perplexed than quaking. Setiya premises his anti-skeptical argument on the proposition that when $x$ falls under non-ethical concept $N$ then, necessarily, it falls under ethical concept $E$. This, however, is exactly what a certain kind of skeptic doubts, globally and across the board. John Mackie can endorse all the solid evidence that you like that a token action has caused harm, has been done from selfish motives, and so forth, and he will nevertheless adamantly reject any claim that the action therefore instantiates any moral concept. Setiya’s response to the skeptical challenge that moral disagreement might undermine the epistemic status of one’s moral judgments appears to boil down to “No, it’s legitimate to maintain confidence in your moral judgments so long as you’re right”—which looks suspiciously like missing the point. But at least, perhaps, he has shifted the dialectic slightly: from a focus on disagreement to a focus on when one can have non-ethical evidence—dependent on a supervenience thesis—for an ethical judgment.

In chapter 2, Setiya argues that the supervenience thesis can underwrite justification for moral judgments even though the judge in question may be in no position to articulate the thesis. Setiya plumps for a reliabilist externalism: the epistemically justified agent must instantiate “a disposition to form beliefs of one kind on the basis of others in a way that tracks, at least roughly, the conditionals involved in Ethical Supervenience” (65). He goes on to address worries raised by Hartry Field and Sharon Street about the implausibility of the existence of such a disposition if the correlation between the facts and our beliefs is mere coincidence. The anti-skeptic, it appears, needs to explain this correlation. (Field raises the worry for the domain of arithmetical beliefs; Street for moral beliefs.)

Suppose I head to the DMV on a given day and find that every one of my departmental colleagues is also there. I would naturally grope for an explanation, but may have to accept the conclusion that it is simply a wild coincidence. Prior to my leaving home, it would be reasonable for me to confidently doubt that such a coincidence will occur, but, once confronted with the unlikely turn of events, there is no call for me to reject the evidence of my own eyes. This is the analogy Setiya uses against Field and Street. While it is reasonable to be dubious of theses that depend on wild coincidences, we need not do