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**SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS**

*Question:* What do you think are the most significant directions that Soviet foreign policy will take in the post-Brezhnev era?

*Answer:* I think that the Soviet Union will continue to concentrate its efforts on Europe. The Soviets see openings for their diplomacy, but also for political intimidation based on force in Europe, and particularly, in the growing American/European tensions. From the Soviet standpoint, any qualitative, even if only gradual, change in the American/European relationship is of central importance, and alters immediately the balance of power. Thus, I expect the Soviets will concentrate on this front. Beyond that, it seems to me the Soviets would be looking for political opportunity both in the Middle East and in Central America. This not so much a matter of what the Soviets would be doing themselves, but rather a matter of exploiting opportunities that may develop because of American failures. If the Middle Eastern peace process becomes stalemated, the Soviets will have bigger opportunities than heretofore, in Egypt and elsewhere. If the U.S. carelessly over-Americanizes the conflict in Central America, the Soviet Union will be able to exploit Latin American resentment against the United States. I would say that these will be the primary points of reference.

*Question:* Do you think that the Soviet interest in Latin America will continue to be exploited via Cuba or do you foresee, at any point, a more direct interventionist role?

*Answer:* I rather expect they’ll be acting through Cuba as its surrogate.

* The editor asked three American experts on Soviet affairs to respond to two broad questions:

  1) What are the most likely directions of the Soviet foreign policy line in the post-Brezhnev era, and how are they likely to affect Soviet-American relations?
  2) What developments in United States-Soviet military/security relations do you consider particularly worrisome, and what would you propose to do about it?

The first response, in the form of an interview, is given by Zbigniew Brzezinski; the second is contributed by Seweryn Bialer; and the third is made by Marshall I. Goldman.

A second set of questions, addressed more specifically to military issues, was made to a Soviet specialist on USSR-U.S. relations. Responding to this request is a contribution from Henry Trofimenko.
Question: What are your predictions for Soviet/American relations in the post-Brezhnev period?
Answer: I don’t expect too much of a change either way. There may be some limited arms control arrangements, but I think for the foreseeable future, the competitive aspects of the relationship will remain predominant.

Question: What developments in U.S./Soviet military or security relations concern you most?
Answer: I do think that one has to be concerned about the implications of the arms race for stability in the relationship between both sides. It is becoming increasingly complex and difficult to manage—the scale of the problems has become of such magnitude that arms control arrangements are becoming increasingly difficult to contrive, even with the best of will. Beyond that, there’s always a possibility of an explosion in the Persian Gulf precipitating both countries into some kind of a collision. These are the subject of which I think very careful attention needs to be given.

Question: Are there particular elements of verification that seem to you to be very critical?
Answer: That depends entirely on what one is trying to verify. I believe that the large, broad agreements, such as SALT II, can be verified, at least to a degree that gives you assurance that large-scale violations would be detected earlier. The problem becomes more complicated when you begin to deal with more advanced and, particularly, mobile systems. There, verification becomes increasingly difficult to attain. If there is a broad agreement, then I think it is important to have verification. I don’t think we should make agreements which we cannot verify and this is why there is a strong case to be made for the zero option with respect to medium-range systems, which are mobile.

Question: Would you like to comment on the new ABM proposals?
Answer: I think that as a long-range issue it is important, and of some substance, and it’s right that we should think about it. However, I am concerned about the timing, the form of the announcement; and last, but not least, by the possibility that the Soviets will conclude that we already have a large-scale program on the way, which then they must match—and I think that would be very regrettable.

Question: What do you foresee concerning Soviet involvement or entanglement in Afghanistan?
Answer: I don’t believe that there will be any basic change.

Question: What proposals might lessen or diminish concerns about U.S./Soviet military or security relations and what do you think might work to lower the level of tension or threat?