In recent years, a number of logicians have contended that Aristotle's procedure in presenting his syllogistic in the *Prior Analytics* (Bk. I, chs. 1-7) is non-demonstrative. Jan Lukasiewicz, for example, holds that Aristotle's theory of the syllogism is "an axiomatized deductive system" and not a demonstrative science. Following his lead, I. M. Bochenski claims that in presenting his theory of the syllogism, Aristotle set forth the "first known axiomatic system, or more precisely the first class of such systems." And while rejecting both Lukasiewicz's and Bochenski's interpretation of Aristotle's syllogistic, Martha Kneale agrees with them in thinking that Aristotle's procedure is not demonstrative.

The issue concerning the demonstrative or non-demonstrative character of the *Prior Analytics*, as well as the other works collected in the *Organon*, was an important one during the Middle Ages. This was the case because at that time logic was generally held to be a science in its own right as well as an instrument of science. Since only a demonstrative procedure was thought to be productive of

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science, it would seem to follow that the procedure employed in the *Prior Analytics* (Bk. I, chs. 1-7) was demonstrative. One finds, however, that Albert the Great, (1193-1280), an important logician of this period and one who emphatically held logic to be a science, is in agreement with Lukasiewicz and others on the non-demonstrative character of the *Prior Analytics* (Bk. I, chs. 1-7). But, unlike the aforementioned authors, Albert, as I intend to show, seems to have conceived of Aristotle's approach to the syllogistic as something like a decision procedure. I also intend to show that such a view is not necessarily incompatible with the belief that the *Prior Analytics* itself counts as a work in science. To do this, first of all it will be useful to have a sketch of Albert's notion of demonstration and demonstrative science.

I

Albert delimits the concept of demonstration in his paraphrase of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, a work which he judged to be demonstrative on two counts: (a) it teaches one how to demonstrate, i.e., it sets forth the principles of demonstration; and (b) in doing so, it exemplifies demonstrations, i.e., it contains demonstrations and thus counts as a demonstrative science. Insofar as it concerns the teaching of demonstration, it has as its subject the demonstrative syllogism: “... est autem haec scientia ut de subjecto de syllogismo demonstrativo: de hoc enim inquirit differentias et passiones et modos

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5 Albert explicitly takes up the question concerning the scientific character of logic in *De praedicabilibus*, tr. I, c. 1. All references to the first tract of the *De praedicabilibus* are based on the edition of Joseph Blarer entitled “De Antecedentibus ad Logicam”, Teoresi Rivista di cultura filosofica, Vol. 9, 1954, pp. 177-242; all other references to the works of Albert are to the Borgnet edition, *Opera Omnia*, (Paris, 1890). He indicates his view of the scientific character of the *Prior Analytics* in the following text: “Sed ad hoc dicendum quod scientia *Posteriorum* magis subalternatur libro *Priorum*, quam e converso: cum subjectum hujus sit sub subjecto illius. Quod enim artifex libri *Priorum* modum accipit demonstrandi, non est a libro *Posteriorum*, sed a demonstratione quae est per experimentum et per viam sensus, a quo oritur omnis scientia: et de tali modo demonstrandi non est scientia *Posteriorum*." *In I post. anal.*, tr. I, c. 2, p. 7b.

6 When speaking of the *modus* employed in the *Posterior Analytics*, Albert states: “Resolutoria enim est haec scientia: quia resolvit et resolvere docet conclusiones in principia, quae sunt causae essentiales et propriae sive convertibles immediate.” *In I post. anal.*, tr. I, c. 1, p. 3b. This text indicates that Albert discerned what might be termed a “show and tell” aspect of Aristotle's work.