Undoubtedly the works of Count D. A. Miliutin will create for him an eternal memory among the Russian People and in the Russian Army, and his name will be inscribed on the tablet of history as one of the great laborers in all of Russia's historical development.  

The Crimean War demonstrated the inadequacy of Russia's military organization and power. Despite the advantages of numbers and geography, the proud victors over Napoleon were unable to dislodge a small French and British expeditionary force from the Crimean shore of the Black Sea. Russia's security was placed in jeopardy; if the empire of the tsars was to survive as a power, military revitalization had to be achieved, and achieved rapidly. The reaction of the tsarist government to this vital problem was the institution of a military reform program. The man who formulated and administered the defense reform program was Dmitrii Miliutin, the War Minister from 1861 until 1881. Historians have examined Miliutin and his reform efforts in some detail. Because much concerning Miliutin has remained unknown or unclear, this scrutiny has focused most sharply on the actual workings of the military reorganization. The result of this necessary focus has been that some interpretive questions associated with the military reform effort have received little or no attention. For example: what was the nature and the historical significance of the defense reorganization measures carried out by Miliutin? What relation did these measures have to other reforms instituted by Alexander II? The purpose of the present paper is to outline the picture of Miliutin and his reform program as it has developed from his day to ours with the aim of summarizing the...

1. Izvestiia Imperatorskoi Nikolaevskoi voennoi akademii, No. 1 (1912). Quoted in I. S. Simonov, Na parmiat' general-fe’dmarshale Russkoi armii grafe Dmitrie Alekseeviche Miliutine (St. Petersburg, 1912), p. 3.
present understanding of Miliutin in relation to these interpretive
questions, and to attempt to indicate some general directions in
which future research on Miliutin and his military program might
add to the understanding of modern Russia.

Military reform was a vast undertaking. Among the main features
of the defense reorganization initiated by Miliutin in the 1860's and
1870's was the abolition of corporal punishment of soldiers, the re-
alignment of the local and central military administration, the erec-
tion of a network of military districts, the improvement of army
housing, health, education and training, the rearmament of the mili-
tary forces, the build-up of military factories, the recasting of army
service and combat regulations, the enactment of universal male
military service legislation, and the modification of the military
courts system in line with the civil judicial reforms of 1864. Because
of their broad social and political and security implications, in one
way or another these measures affected every echelon of Russian
life. Miliutin's program was achieved against the obstinate opposition
of entrenched army, administrative, fiscal, educational, economic and
class interests. In many cases the War Minister's measures also
attracted the hostility of conservative dissenters to Alexander II's
reform impulse. The success of the War Ministry in enacting such a
vast program basically was due to the fear awakened in Russian
society first by the Crimean War, and then by Prussia's spectacular
defeats of Austria and France.

The first trial-by-fire of the effectiveness of the War Ministry's
renewal effort was the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. Miliutin
himself greeted the prospect of a new war in the Balkans with muted
enthusiasm. He feared the domestic impact of the war. The spectre
of possible involvement of the European powers lurked behind his
every move. Moreover, he felt, the army still remained in an unsa-
factory state. Yet the generally successful mobilization of 1876,
the first in the history of the Russian army, and the final military
outcome of the campaigns, demonstrated a level of military effective-
ness much greater than that displayed in the Crimean War. The
military reforms had contributed materially to victory in war. The
struggle against Turkey also made apparent the War Minister's
military leadership capacities. These accomplishments, together with
Miliutin's realistic attitude toward foreign policy issues surrounding
the Congress of Berlin, brought to the War Minister a degree of

2. For the most important and detailed treatments of the military reforms
see: M. I. Bogdanovich, ed., "Istoricheskii ocherk deiatel'nosti voennago uprav-
leniia v pervoe dvadtsati-plati-letie tsarstvovaniia Gosudaria Imperatora Alek-
sandra Nikolaeviicha (1855-1880 gg.)," Voennyi sbornik, CXXXII (1880), 5-57,
257-282; CXXXIII (1880), 5-34; [D. A. Miliutin] "Voennye reformy Impera-
P. A. Zaionchkovski, Voennye reformy 1860-1870 godov v Rossii (Moscow,
1952); Forrestt A. Miller, Dmitrii Miliutin and the Reform Era in Russia
(Nashville, Tenn., 1968).