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Edited by Katerina Ierodiakonou and Pieter Sjoerd Hasper

We are glad to present the nineteenth volume of this journal. Its unitary thematic focus concerns a fruitful discussion of a variety of approaches in Ancient Epistemology. This volume of Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy presents in total eleven articles on the theme of Ancient Epistemology, ranging from the presocratic philosopher Xenophanes to Plotinus and Sextus Empiricus, both by established colleagues and by younger scholars at the beginning of their career. Many interpretations are new or feature new ideas or new applications of ideas. We are confident that they will stimulate the readers to develop their understanding of ancient epistemology in response to them. The Authors: Matthew Duncombe, Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, Patricia Curd, Lucas Angioni, Ada Bronowski, Lee Franklin, Audrey Anton, David Bronstein, Anna Tigani, Andrew Payne, Eleni Perdikouri, Petter Sandstad, Jared Smith and Ádám Tamás Tuboly.

Self-knowledge and Self-deception

The Role of Transparency in First Personal Knowledge

Christoph Michel

Self-knowledge and self-deception present fundamental problems and puzzles to philosophy of mind. In this book accounts of both phenomena are systematically developed and defended against classical and recent views. The proposed 'cognitive ascent model' offers an explanation of the intuitive peculiarity of self-knowledge as well as of the reach and limits of our epistemic privilege. The model builds on a general transparency principle for attitudes. Transparency can be the key to a genuinely first-personal knowledge of attitudes to the extent that someone’s having a certain attitude is to be identified with his attributing a value property to an intentional object. The offered view rejects the strategies of inner sense, parallelism and constitutivism. Paradigmatic self-deception, rather than being a failure of recognizing one’s own mental states is a failure at the level of metacognitive control over belief-formation. Self-deceptive beliefs are formed or maintained against criterial evidence via pseudo-rational adaptations in belief-systems.

Emergent Mechanisms

Reductive Explanation for Limited Beings

Ramiro Glauer

Is our mind explainable in terms of neural mechanisms? How we concieve of ourselves seems strongly to depend on how we respond to this question. In the present work an attempt at an affirmative answer is made. Currently, there are good reasons to believe that we can give a neural-mechanical explanation of how our mind works. In order to show this, first, a concept of mechanistic explanation is developed that is applicable to biological cognitive systems. This accomodates the fact that biological systems are usually complex, integrated systems that cannot be decomposed into a relatively small number of working parts like a clockwork. Complex biological mechanisms exhibit emergent behavior. The complexity of biological systems can be tackled with the aid of a number of methods of analysis. Models of a whole human brain are, for instance, well in reach that can be used to find integrated mechanistic explanations of cognitive capacities. Mind would thus be qualitatively reducible to neural mechanisms.

Beneficial coercion in psychiatry?

Foundations and Challenges

Edited by Jakov Gather, Tanja Henking, Alexa Nossek and Jochen Vollmann

Coercion in the treatment of persons suffering from mental disorders is one of the major ethical controversies in psychiatry. Despite great efforts to reduce the use of coercive interventions, they are still widespread and differ among European countries with regard to the specific type of intervention and the number of affected patients. It is common to justify measures against the present will of patients under the assumption that they promote their well-being, that is, by reference to the ethical principal of beneficence. However, it is indisputable that such measures can also cause severe harm to the patients concerned and that they are often experienced as degrading. So in which situations can coercive interventions justifiably be labeled as »beneficial« at all? How can they be reduced to a minimum? This volume addresses these issues from an interdisciplinary and international perspective, combining contributions of amongst others medical ethicists, philosophers, legal scholars, psychologists, psychiatrists from different European countries. Theoretical and conceptual essays are complemented by contributions with a strong relation to clinical practice.

Series:

Heiner F. Klemme and Ansgar Lorenz

„Der Mensch ist dem Menschen ein Wolf“ – schrieb einst Thomas Hobbes, Autor des berühmten Leviathan. Schon mehrfach glaubten die Gesellschaften in ihrer Geschichte, diese pessimistische Formel vom menschlichen Zusammenleben hinter sich gelassen zu haben. Doch hat uns am Ende der Glaube an das Recht des Stärkeren im Angesicht von Krieg und Terrorismus im 21. Jahrhundert wieder eingeholt?
Hobbes (1588–1679) machte nicht nur als Mitbegründer der modernen politischen Philosophie von sich reden. Viele seiner Ideen sind auch mehr als 350 Jahre nach seinem Tod immer noch präsent. Sie sind Thema im Schulunterricht, an den Universitäten; in allen Zusammenhängen, in denen wahrhaftig philosophiert wird. Der Comic führt anschaulich und gut verständlich in das Leben und Denken des Philosophen ein. Beleuchtet werden beispielsweise seine Anthropologie und sein Gottesbegriff, seine Konzeption des Guten und sein Begriff der Vernunft, seine Prinzipien staatlicher Herrschaft und seine Auffassung vom Reich der Finsternis. Schritt für Schritt werden die Grundbegriffe und intellektuellen Kontexte seiner Lehren und ihrer Wirkungsgeschichte bis in unsere Gegenwart hinein thematisiert. Im Zentrum steht das zugleich epochale wie umstrittene Hauptwerk des Engländers, der 1651 publizierte Leviathan. Wir müssen unsere natürliche Freiheit und unser Recht auf alles aufgeben, um im und durch den Staat Frieden zu finden.
Hobbes’ Philosophie hat auch im 21. Jahrhundert nichts von ihrer Aktualität verloren
Hobbes’ Denken auf anschauliche, verständliche und unterhaltsame Weise erklärt

Edited by Marcus Andreas Born and Claus Zittel

Der traditionell behauptete Gattungsunterschied von wahrheitsorientierter philosophischer Prosa und fiktionaler Literatur stellt sich nicht zuletzt dann als problematisch heraus, wenn Formen des Denkens und Erkennens aus der Betrachtung herausfallen, die sich keinem der beiden Modelle zuordnen lassen.
Das Konzept der »Literarischen Denkformen« soll dazu dienen, philosophische und literarische Modi des Erkennens gleichermaßen einzufangen. Die Leitfragen der vorliegenden Analysen sind somit, ob und auf welche Weise philosophische Texte auf »dichterische« Mittel angewiesen sind und inwiefern Literatur in Philosophie umschlägt, wenn man sich denkend in sie versenkt.

Vorstellen und Darstellen

Szenen einer medienanthropologischen Theorie des Geistes

Eva Schürmann

Wie macht sich der Geist ein Bild von der Welt? – Vermittels Darstellungen. In Texten und Bildern, Filmen und Aufführungen werden Vorstellungen präsentiert, die wie allgegenwärtige Zwischenglieder zwischen uns und den anderen fungieren. Gleichgültig, ob wir etwas erzählen oder ein Bild ins Netz stellen, ob wir Zeitung lesen oder Filme schauen, stets sind es Darstellungen, die Auffassungsweisen vergegenwärtigen.
Schürmann suspendiert anhand einer Theorie des Vorstellens und Darstellens sowie der Analyse spezifischer Darstellungspraxen – wie etwa der legendären Rodney King-Affäre, die angesichts der filmisch dokumentierten Fälle von Gewalt gegen Schwarze in den USA in letzter Zeit erschreckend aktuell geblieben ist – die Behauptung, wir lebten in einem postfaktischen Zeitalter, in dem sich Wahrheit und Fälschung nicht mehr auseinanderhalten ließen. Hiergegen entfaltet das Buch eine Darstellungstheorie in kritisch-therapeutischer Absicht. Es zielt darauf, Darstellungspraxen als spezifisch menschlich, weil geistig und freiheitlich, zu qualifizieren, um im Streit der Interpretationen bessere von schlechteren unterscheiden zu können – am Ende der Lektüre steht die Entwicklung einer „medienkompetenten Urteilskraft“.

Mental Representation and Self-Consciousness

From Basic Self-Representation to Self-Related Cognition

Gottfried Vossgerau

One oft the most fascinating abilities of humans is the ability to become conscious of the own physical and mental states. In this systematic investigation of self-consciousness, a representational theory is developed that is able to distinguish between different levels of self-consciousness. The most basic levels are already present in such simple animals as ants. From these basic forms, which are also relevant for adult human self-consciousness, high-level self-consciousness including self-knowledge can arise. Thereby, the theory is not only able to integrate developmental considerations but also to sharply distinguish different aspects of the complex phenomenon self-consciousness. Pathological breakdowns of these different aspects, as they can be found in schizophrenia, are explained by specific impairments on different levels of self-representation. In this way, the work shows that a naturalistic theory of self-consciousness is possible, if the analysis starts with very simple and basic mechanisms instead of starting on the 'top of the iceberg'.

Concepts and Categorization

Systematic and Historical Perspectives

Edited by David Hommen, Christoph Kann and Tanja Oswald

The study of concepts lies at the intersection of various disciplines, both analytic and empiric. The rising cognitive sciences, for instance, are interested in concepts insofar as they are used in an explanation of such diverse epistemic phenomena like categorization, inference, memory, learning, and decision-making. In philosophy, the challenge imposed by conceptualization consists, among other things, in accommodating reverse intuitions about concepts like shareability, mind-dependency, mediation between reference, knowledge and reality, etc. While researchers have collaborated more and more to contribute to a unified understanding of concepts and categorization, the joint venture unfortunately suffers (so far) from the fact that it is generally left unclear how exactly the different approaches undertaken in the participating sciences relate to each other. What do psychologists and philosophers mean by the notion of a concept? Is there a core-theory of concepts and categorization underlying analytical and empirical studies? The present collection of essays addresses these and related questions and tries to answer them from both a systematic and a historical perspective.

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Edited by Paul André Harris and Michael Crawford

The essays in this volume all originated at the 2001 conference of the International Society for the Study of Time. The theme 'Time and Uncertainty' sounds redundant, but the contributions try to come to terms with the irreducible openness of time and the impermanence of life. The essays from various disciplines have been grouped around 'fracture and rupture' (grappling with time and uncertainty as a breach) and 'rapture and structure (solving uncertainty into pattern).