in which China behaves in the South China Sea at present. This does not bode well for the future.
Another serious matter is the manner in which refugees that come across the Mediterranean are treated. We must also realise that climate change may in the future generate a flow of refugees in the
and what it is not, Indonesia has wealth of experience on defining what is marine genetic resources in our vast waters stretching from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea to the Pacific Ocean. For us, under our laws, regulations and culture, marine genetic resources include all life forms at sea
difficulties. Taiwan (Province of China) is a major international fishing entity. Its high seas fishing capacity is extensive and likely to increase, especially in the Indian and South Pacific Oceans. However, due to political non-recognition, Taiwan (Province of China) does not participate fully in any
Perspective on the Preparatory Phase’ in M. Nordquist, J. N. Moore, R Long, Cooperation and Engagement in the South China Sea And Asia Pacific Region (Leiden/Boston: Brill/Nijhoff, 2019) 443–468; R Long and M Rodríguez‐Chaves, ‘Anatomy of a New International Instrument for Biodiversity beyond National
article 121(3) that the term “rock” only applies to islands “which cannot sustain human habitation or an economic life of their own.” 39
The first international judicial interpretation of article 121(3) featured in the arbitral award in the 2016 case brought by the Philippines against China under the
, China, Japan, and South Korea and India are taking special interest in many aspects of the Arctic that focus on scientific research, shipping, and resource development. This chapter explores the growing interests of China, Japan, South Korea in the Arctic and examines the nature of their interests and
October 2018, the Arctic Five, the group of five Arctic littoral States (the United States, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Russia), along with five other states: China, Japan, South Korea, Iceland, and the EU, which control large, distant-water fishing fleets, agreed to a 16-year moratorium on commercial
igc 3 para 12.4 (c).
93 See e.g., Earth News Bulletin 25.3.19 from igc 2 Caricom and psids want a sui generis approach to ip ; G77/ China, African Group, Iran, Tonga, Federated States of Micronesia, Turkey, png , Sri Lanka and Cuba want ip included in the ilbi ; Singapore want ip to be
supplemented by the common heritage of mankind principle put forward robustly by the G77 + China group as dispositive of the status of marine genetic resources beyond abnj .
This brings us to one of the most simplistic heuristics in the bbnj negotiations – that the common heritage of mankind ( chm ) and
Distant-water fishing is a strategic industry in China on the grounds that it can guarantee the supply of domestic products, facilitate cooperation between Chinese and foreign fishery companies, and serve as an important component of the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative.” 1 Started in
The next article, entitled, ‘Strengthening the Legal Protection of Female Labourers in Marine Fisheries - A Chinese Perspective,’ by Ruiyao He and Yen-Chiang Chang of Dalian Maritime University in China, highlights the vulnerability and lack of effective legal protection of the
[of the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement].” 146
188.8.131.52 South China Sea Arbitration (Republic of Philippines v The People’s Republic of China)
In 2013, the Philippines instituted action against China and tasked the itlos Annex vii Arbitral Tribunal with determining the “legal basis of
the recent cases experienced by Indonesian fishing crew workers.
On 6 May 2020, South Korea’s Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation ( mbc ) published a video showing a group of men on a Chinese fishing vessel throwing overboard into the ocean an orange body bag which was later discovered to contain the
On 4 January 2020, the World Health Organisation ( who ) reported on social media that a small cluster of pneumonia cases had occurred in Wuhan, Hubei Province. 1 On 12 January, China publicly shared the genetic sequence of what has become internationally known as COVID-19. 2 At the time of
, and the first three of these are what one would normally term open registries. However, in terms of the beneficial ownership of merchant ships, the top five States were Greece, Japan, China, Singapore and the Hong Kong SAR. 5 In other words, there is no correlation between the three largest States of
extremely relevant. 2
The perception of the strong hydrocarbon potential of the East China Sea became generally known with the publication in 1968 of a report prepared by a group of scientists from Japan, the Republic of Korea (RoK), Taiwan (which does not have statehood) and the United States of America
unclos obligations during the pandemic. Yubing Shi reports from China about the adoption of the 2020 Amendment to China’s Distant-Water Fishing Regulations and supplementary regulations including closing fisheries on the high seas for Chinese nationals. Professor Shi suggests that this legal reform may
-making and to eliminate gender discrimination in small-scale fisheries. In addition, all parties should work together to develop a functional assessment system to assess the impact of legislation, policies and action on improving women’s status and achieving gender equality.
China is the largest fishery
On 13 July 2020, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo released the U.S. position on China’s claims in the South China Sea, four years – almost to the day – that a tribunal constituted under Annex vii of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea rejected China’s claims. 1 The U
The demilitarisation provisions of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty are limited and contingent. Critically, a functional gap is enabled within the key Article I, which both prohibits ‘measures of a military nature’ and sanctions the use of military personnel and equipment in pursuit of ‘peaceful purposes’. None of the key terms and concepts are defined. With increasing focus on and in the Antarctic Treaty Area on interstate competition around resource access and regime control, and in particular the rapidly increasing geopolitical struggle between ‘the West’ and China both globally and within the Antarctic, and the transformation of what military activity actually entails, the existing demilitarisation principles are now inadequate. The failure to update these in the 60 years since the Antarctic Treaty was adopted, the lack of confidence that the historic Antarctic Treaty model of regional governance can itself manage the struggle, and indications over recent years that some states are even increasing the level of military entanglement with their Antarctic programmes, suggest it is now timely to reassess and respond to the case for substantive demilitarisation in the Antarctic Treaty Area.
Built in 2009, Kunlun Station, China’s third Antarctic research station, is located in the Dome A region. In 2013, during the 36th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM), China proposed the establishment of a new Antarctic Specially Managed Area (ASMA) within Dome A and prepared a draft management plan for it. Yet, several ATCM members questioned China’s motives for designating Dome A as a new ASMA, and, as a result, no consensus could be reached. Surprisingly however, the Chinese ASMA proposal spurred a new impulse to introduce guidelines for the designation of ASMAs. This paper explores the legal implications of China’s proposal for an ASMA at Kunlun Station in Dome A and, in particular, focuses on the new legal developments that followed.
telecommunication submarine cables. Many cable systems connecting different regions of the world pass through AMS waters. ASEAN could leverage its close partnership with important users of submarine cables, such as the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, India and the European Union, to push for more
Authorisations of ballast water treatment systems by the IMO
The authorisations are dominated by the three shipbuilding States, namely, China, Republic of Korea and Japan, which collectively have granted thirty-eight authorisations (Table 1). The thirteen administrations that granted authorisations
In 1985, China National Fisheries Corporation, the largest state-owned fishing company in the country, sent its first distant water fishing fleet of 13 vessels to West Africa. Over the past 35 years, China has become the largest distant water fishing ( DWF ) State in the world
(South China Sea – Natuna Sea – Karimata Strait – Western Java Sea – Sunda Strait – Indian Ocean), IASL II (Pacific Ocean – Makassar Strait – Lombok Strait – Pacific Ocean – Sulawesi Sea – Indian Ocean), and IASL III (Pacific Ocean – Molucca Sea – Seram Sea – Banda Sea – Ombai Strait – Savu Sea
example is definitely the imposition of a condition that deep mining activities must be in the public interest of the sponsoring State, which can be found in the legislation of Singapore, 50 China 51 and several Pacific island States. For example, Tonga, Tuvalu and Kiribati do not issue a certificate of
Yoshifumi Tanaka, The South China Sea Arbitration: Toward an International Legal Order in the Oceans (Oxford, Hart Publishing) 2019, ISBN : 9781509924813, hardbound £80.00, 312 pp.
The South China Sea Arbitration has been among the most significant cases decided under the compulsory
’affectation spéciale a été constitué avec l’aide du Korea Maritime Institute , du China Institute of International Studies et du Gouvernement chinois pour fournir une aide financière aux participants au programme de stage et à l’Académie d’été qui viennent de pays en développement. Je tiens à exprimer notre
Part XV, Section 2 with respect to the disputes referred to in article 298, paragraphs 1 (a), (b) and (c) of the Convention.
The Government of the People’s Republic of China does not accept any of the procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention
Convention on the Law of the Sea: Arctic Sunrise and South China Sea Compared
dans I NTERPRETATIONS OF THE U NITED N ATIONS C ONVENTION ON THE L AW OF THE S EA BY I NTERNATIONAL C OURTS AND T RIBUNALS (Angela Del Vecchio et Roberto Virzo, éds., Cham, Switzerland, Springer, 2019), p. 171
the Law of the Sea », 9 Chinese JIL , 2010; « Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing: Responses in General and in West Africa », 10(2) Chinese JIL , 2011; « Non-Appearance before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea », Indian Journal of International Law , Vol. 53, No. 4, oct