Search Results

You are looking at 1 - 10 of 17 items for :

  • Author or Editor: T x
  • Ethics & Moral Philosophy x
  • Primary Language: English x

A Quarter Century of Value Inquiry

Presidential Addresses before the American Society for Value Inquiry

Series:

Richard T. Hull

This volume contains all of the presidential addresses given before the American Society for Value Inquiry since its first meeting in 1970. Contributions are by Richard Brandt*, Virgil Aldrich*, John W. Davis*, the late Robert S. Hartman*, James B. Wilbur*, the late William H. Werkmeister, Robert E. Carter, the late William T. Blackstone, Gene James, Eva Hauel Cadwallader, Richard T. Hull, Norman Bowie*, Stephen White*, Burton Leiser+, Abraham Edel, Sidney Axinn, Robert Ginsberg, Patricia Werhane, Lisa M. Newton, Thomas Magnell, Sander Lee, John M. Abbarno, Ruth Miller Lucier, and Tom Regan*. Autobiographical sketches* by all of the living contributors and one recently deceased, biographical statements of the remainder, together with photographic portraits of all the contributors*, make this volume a unique record of value inquiry during the past quarter century. (* indicates previously unpublished or unpublished in the present form; + indicates substantial new material has been added.) The addresses cover diverse topics, from broad, general ones, to value inquiry into literature, bioethics, and public policy; to philosophy of mind, to critical studies of other philosophers' work, defenses of philosophy and of applied ethics, individual-, role- and cultural-relativism of values. The American Society for Value Inquiry is nearing its 25th anniversary. Its leadership is elected annually, often with a vice president becoming president-elect, then president, then past president: a structure that serves to insure a measure of continuity. Its members are drawn to the society not by a particularly credo or ideology or philosophical position, but by a common interest in questions of value, ranging from abstract meta-value inquiry to disciplinary and trans-disciplinary value inquiry. For those who share this range of passions, the volume will preserve, collect, organize, and in a number of cases recover material in danger of being lost to them. The Presidential Address is a unique genre, resembling in some ways a sermon. Indeed, preparing a presidential address before a philosophical society is often an exercise in developing an exhortation to members to take up a neglected topic, to embrace as important a particular viewpoint; it may as well be a cautionary to avoid a particular error. It is often a dramatic moment: as a last act of the presidency, having observed closely the trends and winds blowing through the discipline, the speaker is afforded the opportunity to hold forth on a topic at once intensely personal and believed to be of wide interest. While some societies publish presidential addresses in newsletters or informal proceedings, and occasionally in professional bulletins or journals, rarely have a substantial bloc of a society's presidential addresses been collected and published under one cover. Too often the presidential address is delivered, discussed by those present, perhaps summarized in a paragraph in a newsletter to members, and filed as a fond memory of a moment of honor in the papers of the author - sometimes to be forgotten, lost, discarded, or otherwise removed from availability to scholars of the history of philosophy. This volume inaugurates a series aiming at preserving presidential and other major addresses before philosophical societies. It seeks to be a historical record, not only of the address but also of the reflections and recollections of the author. It seeks to preserve as a part of the historical record a photograph of the author. And, with the personal character of an autobiographical statement, it seeks to humanize and render lively and real the professional process and motivating passions that resulted in that set of remarks before that audience on that day in history.

Andreas T. Schmidt

Several Dutch politicians have recently argued that medical voluntary euthanasia laws should be extended to include healthy elderly citizens who suffer from non-medical ‘existential suffering’ (‘life fatigue’ or ‘completed life’). In response, some seek to show that cases of medical euthanasia are morally permissible in ways that completed life euthanasia cases are not. I provide a different, societal perspective. I argue against assessing the permissibility of individual euthanasia cases in separation of their societal context and history. An appropriate justification of euthanasia needs to be embedded in a wider solidaristic response to the causes of suffering. By classifying some suffering as ‘medical’ and some as ‘non-medical’, most societies currently respond to medical conditions in importantly different ways than they do to non-medical suffering. In medical cases, countries like the Netherlands have a health care, health research and public health system to systematically assign responsibilities to address causes of medical suffering. We lack such a system for non-medical suffering among elderly citizens, which makes completed life euthanasia importantly different from euthanasia in medical cases. Because of this moral ‘responsibility gap’, focusing on the permissibility of completed life euthanasia in separation of wider societal duties to attend to possible causes is societally inappropriate. To spell out this objection in more philosophical terms, I introduce the concept of acts that are morally permissible but contextually problematic.

Lani Watson and Alan T. Wilson

This review essay provides a critical discussion of Linda Zagzebski’s (2017) Exemplarist Moral Theory (emt). We agree that emt is a book of impressive scope that will be of interest to ethical theorists, as well as epistemologists, philosophers of language, and philosophers of religion. Throughout the critical discussion we argue that exemplarism faces a number of important challenges, firstly, in dealing with the fallibility of admiration, which plays a central role in the theoretical framework, and secondly, in serving as a practical guide for moral development. Despite this, we maintain that emt points the way for significant future theoretical and empirical research into some of the most well-established questions in ethical theory.

Series:

Edited by Robert N. Fisher, Daniel T. Primozic, Peter A. Day and Joel A. Thompson

This book explores many of the issues that arise when we consider persons who are in pain, who are suffering, and who are nearing the end of life. Suffering provokes us into a journey toward discovering who we are and forces us to rethink many of the views we hold about ourselves.

Meaning and Morality

Essays on the Philosophy of Julius Kovesi

Series:

Edited by Alan Tapper and T. Brian Mooney

Julius Kovesi's Moral Notions (1967) was a startlingly original contribution to moral philosophy and theory of meaning. After initial positive reviews Kovesi's book was largely forgotten. Nevertheless, it continued to have an enduring influence on a number of philosophers and theologians some of whom have contributed to this volume. The original essays collected here critique, analyze, deepen and extend the work of Kovesi. The book will be of particular interest to moral philosophers and those working on concept formation, while also having a broader appeal to social scientists grappling with the description/evaluation problem.

Andreas T. Schmidt

Is freedom a plausible political value for animals? If so, does this imply that animals are owed legal personhood rights or can animals be free but remain human property? Drawing on different conceptions of freedom, I will argue that while positive freedom, libertarian self-ownership, and republican freedom are not plausible political values for animals, liberal ‘option-freedom’ is. However, because such option-freedom is in principle compatible with different legal statuses, animal freedom does not conceptually imply a right to legal self-ownership. Nonetheless, a concern for animal option-freedom means that humans do have a pro tanto duty of non-interference. Arguments familiar from the liberal tradition moreover imply that such a duty speaks for drastic reforms of existing animal law. But it does not imply wholesale abolitionism: it neither rules out positive duties towards animals nor means that we should abandon all interactions with animals.

T. M. Scanlon

Explains how a contractualist moral theory can explain the moral phenomena commonly called rights, although it does not appeal to the notion of a right as a basic element of moral thinking, or explain the difference between rights violations and wrongs of other kinds. Argues that the latter failure is not an important fault.

T. M. Scanlon

Considers the variety of egalitarian ideas and, the compatibility of equality with the recognition of forms of valuable accomplishment.

T. M. Scanlon

Discusses the variety of objections to inequality, relations between these objections, and the implications of this pluralist view of equality for the question of cosmopolitanism about justice.