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William Hynes

William Zartman

William Zartman

Abstract

Although analysts have long held that bias disqualifies a mediator, more recent analysis, pioneered by Saadia Touval, shows that bias can be quite helpful to mediation under the assumption that the mediator delivers the agreement of the party toward which it is biased. Of course, the mediator is still expected to be trustworthy in dealing with the parties and reliable in communications. Prenegotiation and diagnosis, probably the least analyzed early stages of negotiation, are shown to be crucial to a successful negotiation and the necessary preconditions to an efficient and effective process. Leverage, the term for “power” in negotiation, is a scarce resource and takes the form of effective persuasion rather than material inducements and punishments; it depends above all on the need of the conflicting parties for an agreement, which in turn depends on the attractiveness of their alternatives or security points (BATNAs).

William Zartman

Abstract

How, under current conditions, do negotiators find a resolving formula that is enticing to the parties in internal conflicts and that lasts? The search for an answer about this process can take three paths: One that focuses on the context provided by the conflict itself, another that examines the content of the appropriate outcome, and a third that looks at the conduct of parties in their negotiating roles. A particular challenge comes from the internal and international reactions – primarily Islamic – to the encroachment of globalization into their area, where the challenge is to move the conflict from non-negotiable to negotiable. A wide range of conflicts will be used to illustrate the conceptual discussion.

William Bottom

Abstract

The Paris Peace Conference was arguably the most complex negotiation ever undertaken. The principal product of the conference, the Treaty of Versailles, failed to accomplish any of its framers' major goals. Relations between the Allies themselves and the Allies and their defeated enemies seriously deteriorated as a consequence of the negotiations and attempts to implement the treaty. Economic conditions in Germany, the rest of Europe, and eventually the United States declined as well. At the time of the Treaty's publication, John Maynard Keynes and a considerable number of other participants predicted these events, pointing to the negotiators' errors and oversights as a primary cause. The logic of Keynes' argument is re-examined in light of recent research on the psychology of human information processing, judgment and choice. It reveals that his approach is actually very consistent with and anticipates both Simon's conception of bounded rationality and recent work on cognitive heuristics and illusions. Negotiator bias has been studied almost exclusively using simple laboratory settings. The catastrophic lose-lose nature of the Versailles Treaty illustrates the way in which complexity necessitates reliance on simplifying heuristics while propagating and amplifying the impact of the bias that is generated. Evidence from the treaty negotiations and the failed implementation of the treaty suggest some very significant boundary conditions for the application of rational choice models in the business, politics, and international relations contexts. It also demonstrates the need for negotiations researchers to focus more attention on the implementation of agreements and the long-term effects of those agreements on relationships.