Comparing the three-form reasoning of new Hetu-vidya with Western logic, scholars have put forward four perspectives. Combining their strengths and shortcomings, and the examples of Hetu-vidya reasoning, we can conclude that the three-form reasoning should have four forms: (1) the affirmative expression of formal implication; (2) the modus ponens of hypothetical reasoning concerning sufficient conditions after universal instantiation; (3) the negative expression of a formal implication; and (4) the modus tollens of hypothetical reasoning concerning sufficient conditions after universal instantiation.
This paper argues that St. Anselm’s distinction of the two senses of existence in his ontological argument for the existence of God renders Paul Tillich’s refutation of it invalid. At the same time, Anselm misuses the two types of existence in his ontological comparison, leading to a logical contradiction between the different kinds and degrees of existence. Since Anselm’s idea of different reference subjects does not coherently solve this logical absurdity, Anselm’s ontological argument falls well short of being a successful approach to establishing the existence of God.
Descartes’ metaphysical doubts in the Third and Fifth Meditations present a scenario like this: it is possible that I (the Meditator) am so imperfect as to be deceived by my author (i.e., an omnipotent God/Deceiver) in the matters which I think I perceive clearly and distinctly. The metaphysical doubts attempt to cast doubt on beliefs based on present or recollected clear and distinct perceptions. This paper clarifies the intension of the metaphysical doubts by answering the question of how an omnipotent God/Deceiver might exercise a deceptive influence on clear and distinct perception. My analysis shows: (1) the memory interpretation and the retrospective interpretation to be implausible; (2) the incoherence interpretation to be ill-founded, though its conclusion is partly right, such that we should accept a weaker version of it; (3) the misrepresentation interpretation, the defective-origin interpretation, the truth-value variation interpretation and the radical interpretation to be plausible; (4) all of these credible interpretations to be compatible with each other as well.
This article aims to show that the concept of “naturalness” in the Laozi is able to provide cultural guidance concerning values for contemporary social development. Specifically, the Laozi’s concept of “naturalness”—manifested in the text’s exhortation to “honor the dao and exalt the de” and its statement that “the dao models itself on naturalness”—has profound ontological, political and social implications concerning “naturalness” that are strongly expressed through a variety of propositions including “achieving all through non-action” and “downsizing the state and simplifying the people.” With respect to the question about individuals living a life of appropriateness and establishing their destiny, the Laozi emphasizes such cultivation methods as “sticking to simplicity and authenticity” and “watching in quietude and observing in depth,” which are also infused with the conception of “naturalness,” which stresses the notion that understanding the harmony between man and nature can provide useful lessons for the development of contemporary human society.
In section 1, I will describe how moral responsibility requires normative competence. In section 2, I will introduce an influential social psychology experiment and consider one of its philosophical interpretations, situationism. In section 3, I will discuss the possession response in defense of normative competence. This is an approach to save normative competence via possession, and in turn the concept of the morally responsible agent, by relinquishing the need for exercising normative competence. After discussing its pros and cons, section 4 will focus on the exercise response, which emphasizes each singular exercise of normative competence. Given these two responses, I will argue that we are faced with a dilemma. If we admit that the concept of the morally responsible agent is grounded in the mere possession of normative competence, then the concept becomes useless in a practical sense, forcing us to embrace a concept that is tied to the exercise of normative competence. If we admit that the morally responsible agent is grounded in only the exercise of normative competence, the concept of the morally responsible agent no longer aligns with common sense.
This article argues that the problem of modernity concerns the circumstances of existence and human destiny in modern times. To understand the nature of this problem and find the corresponding solution, we need to reinterpret the thought of Karl Marx regarding the contradictions of human existence and its historical dimensions. Following Marx’s line of thinking, this article reviews his critical sequence, creative transformation, and development of duality of thought on man and the world in Western history, focusing on the following four issues: (1) how Marx, on the basis of man’s sensuous objective activities, observes the duality of man and the world as well as the relationship between man’s internal and external activities; (2) how Marx discloses the true connotation and real significance of man’s historical existence, history, and historicity; (3) how Marx reveals the inherent contradictions of modern capitalist society and the destiny of modern man based on historic thought concerning man’s existence; and (4) by praising Marx’s views on material production and the eternal significance of ancient Greek culture, the article reveals another dimension of Marx’s thought, a dimension that tends to be ignored. This article holds that in this era of globalization, it is extremely important and urgent to have an in-depth understanding of Marx’s historical thoughts regarding human existence and of the feasibility of his theory. Moreover, it is imperative to further develop this understanding to create a clearer picture of our own path of development and our outlook on humanity.
When Western science was introduced to modern China, more translated words were used to express fundamental concepts and terms than borrowed words. The process of academic translation, commensuration, and communication between Western and Chinese philosophy is a process of comparative philosophical research. Nowadays, however, it seems that Chinese philosophy is evaluated by a Western Hegelian criterion. This leads to the debate over whether or not China has philosophy. But it is meaningless to argue about whether or not China has the name of philosophy. The key issue is whether or not China has the actuality of philosophy. Looking at the history of Western philosophy, it seems that the Hegelian definition of philosophy was the only one that existed in Europe. However, during the last 200 years after Hegel that the two main philosophical trends of positivism (scientism) and irrationalism developed from anti-Hegelianism or “Spurning Metaphysics.” As metaphysics is being reconstructed, the ghost of Hegel has reappeared. It is clear that in the future, philosophy will evolve from the development of human metaphysics or cultural philosophy. It is a process of the “negation of negation”: from traditional metaphysics to the spurning of metaphysics, and then to human metaphysics.
The reason for the emergence of consciousness of filial piety is that parental care could activate reciprocal filial piety. Parental care and filial piety are two supplementary phenomena caused by the same time consciousness. Phenomenology neglects consciousness of filial piety because it lacks the thinking that sees the fundamental “meaning of time” in the intersection of “past” and “future”. The consciousness of filial piety can only be really constituted by a human being’s personal experience. “Frustrations in personal life” and “breeding of children for oneself” are two occasions for an adult to fight against the separating effect of individualized consciousness and regain awareness of filial piety.
Ancient Chinese philosophers were inclined to preserve the doctrine of a unified body and mind rather than to engage in a discussion on the separation of the two. In addition, most traditional Chinese philosophers stressing in particular the function of mind. Based on the tradition of believing in the concept of qi, they traced the cause of their spiritual activities to the natural effect of the qi. The modalities display a phenomenological characteristic that looks at mental activities lightly, and examines language and action as a natural revelation of material force, qi.
Scholars of Marx often spend much effort to emphasize the socio-historical characteristics of Marx’s concept of nature. At the same time, from this concept of nature, one seems to be able to deduce a strong sense of historical anthropocentricism and relativism. But through an exploration of the results of Rorty’s discarding the distinction between “natural” and “man-made” and Strauss’ clearing up value relativism in terms of the concept of nature, people will find that historicism is a world outlook that brought its historical circumstances on itself. It neglects the fundamental role of nature in the structure of the relationships between nature and history. A modern result of it is that it fails to offer any universal norms.