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Abstract
This chapter shows that the emerging phenomenon called biolaw would benefit from philosophically critical exercises to secure a good fit with international criminal law (icl). Although legal experts agree to treat icl as the primary framework for conceptualization and dynamic realization (through norm-conferment, -implementation and -enforcement), the implied (bio)law-and-(bio)ethics integration can still be construed in different ways, thereby paving more than one path for biolaw. With the emphasis on transplant-related crimes, the authors try to capture a notion of important biolaw stakes, which provides direction-posts for the inescapable marketplace discussion. The argument draws on a broad stakeholder jurisprudence that does not overplay the distinction between capitalism and altruism – to avoid the abandonment of vulnerable cum poor stakeholders. Critically, theories may look like instances of activist jurisprudence, lines of argument and reasoning that would (better) explain, (re)direct and (ethically) enhance the realm, but nevertheless fail substantively or procedurally, or both.
This essay shows that the emerging phenomenon called biolaw would benefit from philosophically critical exercises to secure a good fit with international criminal law (icl). Although legal experts agree to treat icl as the primary framework for conceptualisation and dynamic realisation (through norm-conferment, – implementation and -enforcement), the implied (bio)law-and-(bio)ethics integration can still be construed in different ways, thereby paving more than one path for biolaw. With the emphasis on transplant-related crimes, the authors try to capture a notion of important biolaw stakes, which provides direction-posts for the inescapable marketplace discussion. The argument draws on a broad stakeholder jurisprudence that does not overplay the distinction between capitalism and altruism – to avoid the abandonment of vulnerable cum poor stakeholders. Critically, theories may look like instances of activist jurisprudence, lines of argument and reasoning that would (better) explain, (re)direct and (ethically) enhance the realm, but which nevertheless fail substantively or procedurally, or both.
When responses to international crimes are managed in terms of post-conflict justice, this event may end ‘the demarcation debate’ before it has begun, thereby rendering it superfluous among legal scholars. This is to say that the transition from theory to reality arguably has the effect of cancelling any sharp distinction between international criminal law, international human rights law and international humanitarian law, as well as extending international criminal justice into the moral territory. Certainly, this is a premise for the dual-aspect defense of those rights that help to explain the non-separation. However, to the extent that the defense discords with traditional assumptions, relevant aspects of pro-separation reasoning must be considered. These are accommodated under the triple-thesis whereby the unequal status of different (rights-)categories limit norm-integration. The author’s account of the competing programs shows a series of flaws in the case of the triple-thesis doctrine, amounting to a vicious circle ‘argument’.