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A major challenge for investment treaty designers and adjudicators is to separate opportunistic behavior by host states that should be sanctioned under international law from bona fide public policy measures that should not. This article suggests that international investment agreements (iias) need to be both ‘smarter’ and more ‘flexible’ to better make that distinction. It draws on economic contract theory as a basic framework, and political economy theory for fine-tuning.

In: The Journal of World Investment & Trade
In: Reshaping the Investor-State Dispute Settlement System
In: Responsibilities of the Non-State Actor in Armed Conflict and the Market Place
In: Immunities in the Age of Global Constitutionalism


International election monitoring has become ever more important in the national as well as the international context. Plenty of (regional) International Organizations (and NGOs) send Election Observers Missions (EOMs) to countries in order to assess the quality of their democratic process and elections. Whereas the influence of EOMs is largely undisputed, their independence, impartiality and accountability have been less discussed. This paper describes the legal set-up of EOMs in order to assess their independence and accountability. It also uses accountability mechanisms as discussed in international law scholarship (ILA Report and the Global Administrative Law project) in order to analyze the accountability mechanisms currently in place for EOMs.

In: International Organizations Law Review