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Abstract

This article, a corrective to long-time frustration experienced by the United States in mediating Israel-Palestine differences, argues for American recognition of a Palestinian state to reach a two-state solution. Recognition, though not even-handed, constitutes legitimate mediation, as confronting one or another primary antagonist can be a useful mediation strategy. Though Israel is likely to object to US recognition of Palestine, analysis suggests the objection is not likely to lead to a break in Israel-American relations, which would jeopardize the valued Israel-American alliance. Recognition as a fallback option is recommended for the Trump administration’s way forward in mediating the conflict.

In: New Issues in Mediating the Israel-Palestine Deadlock

Abstract

This article, a corrective to long-time frustration experienced by the United States in mediating Israel-Palestine differences, argues for American recognition of a Palestinian state to reach a two-state solution. Recognition, though not even-handed, constitutes legitimate mediation, as confronting one or another primary antagonist can be a useful mediation strategy. Though Israel is likely to object to US recognition of Palestine, analysis suggests the objection is not likely to lead to a break in Israel-American relations, which would jeopardize the valued Israel-American alliance. Recognition as a fallback option is recommended for the Trump administration’s way forward in mediating the conflict.

In: New Issues in Mediating the Israel-Palestine Deadlock

Abstract

This article, a corrective to long-time frustration experienced by the United States in mediating Israel-Palestine differences, argues for American recognition of a Palestinian state to reach a two-state solution. Recognition, though not even-handed, constitutes legitimate mediation, as confronting one or another primary antagonist can be a useful mediation strategy. Though Israel is likely to object to us recognition of Palestine, analysis suggests the objection is not likely to lead to a break in Israel-American relations, which would jeopardize the valued Israel-American alliance. Recognition as a fallback option is recommended for the Trump administration’s way forward in mediating the conflict.

In: International Negotiation

Successful third-party diplomatic mediation illustrates diplomacy as a causative, independent element in world politics. This article asks how mediators forge agreement between force-prone, deadlocked parties in intractable diplomatic conflict, and why some such conflicts are more difficult to mediate than others. It compares three interstate and three intrastate mediation cases, each probed as a deviant episode, and tests the conventional view that intrastate conflict presents the more difficult mediation challenge. Confirming that intrastate conflict is more difficult to mediate than its interstate counterpart, the study narrows and refines the sources of the added difficulty.

In: International Negotiation
Author: Barry H Steiner

Abstract

This article pits two diplomatic strategies in competition for policy officials’ support. Distributive strategies promote one party’s goals at the expense of another. Integrative strategies promote goals that are in conflict with those of another state. The focus is strategy choice and strategy’s bargaining potential of less developed countries (LDC) coalitions in the GATT/WTO regime. Amrita Narlikar, whose study of LDC coalitions is relied upon here, finds that many LDC states employ distributive strategy because of asymmetric structure, which emphasizes the gap between LDC and developed state capabilities, yet she critiques that strategy as ineffective in supporting LDC objectives. This disconnect is probed in this article, which concludes that LDC distributive strategy must be improved and that the integrative strategy’s success in attaining LDC objectives can be important enough to override the structural argument for distributive strategy.

In: International Negotiation