Philosophers' reflections on history have been dominated for decades by two themes: representation and memory. On both of these accounts, historical inquiry is divided by a certain gap from what it seeks to find or wants to know, and its activity is seen by philosophers as that of bridging this gap. Against this background, the concept of experience, in spite of its apparent rootedness in the present, can be revived as a means of thinking about our connection to the past. After examining variants on the concept of experience, with special attention to its temporality, I argue in this essay that experience can be said to furnish a connection to the past that underlies both memory and representation.
This article examines two contradictory patterns of reasoning that share the same (minor) premise that rival religious perspectives can authorise rationally non-negotiable moral principles. The first argument goes against separate religious or other culturally grounded moral education, because this would lead to indoctrination. The second argument indicates the impossibility of a common moral education, because moral perspectives are internally related to religious view-points. The author challenges both arguments on the grounds that religious perspectives need not lead to a non-rational approach to moral education.
Moral conceptions of personal identity seem liable to different, more or less interesting, interpretations. This paper argues that on more interesting interpretations, moral identity is more a significant feature of personal identity than actually synonymous with it. The paper then proceeds to identify and evaluate the relative merits of very diverse conceptions of the relationship of person to moral agency in the major traditions of moral theory.