In this article, Emily Crawford explores one set of key institutional and legal responses to, and consequences of, the Rwanda genocide – the ictr and the revival of icl that the ictr and the icty heralded. Tracing the development of the concept and institutions of icl, Crawford observes how the case law of the [ad hoc] tribunals, and the ictr in particular, were pivotal in progressively developing the international law of genocide, and the law of non-international armed conflict’.
In the years following the adoption of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in 1977, debate emerged regarding the extant lacunae in the international rules relating to armed conflict. It was argued that there were gaps in international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law with regards to so-called ‘grey-zone conflicts’ – armed conflicts that did not reach the minimum threshold of either Protocol II or Common Article 3. Therefore, it was proposed that a declaration outlining the minimum humanitarian standards applicable in all situations of violence and conflict be adopted. By 1990, this debate had crystallised around the Turku Declaration on Minimum Humanitarian Standards. However, progress on the declaration quickly stalled once discussion was moved to the United Nations. Since 1995, there have been nine reports by the Secretary-General on the question of fundamental standards of humanity to use the current terminology. Over the years, the scope and content the fundamental standards of humanity has become clearer, yet the adoption of a document on these fundamental standards is no more imminent than when the issue first moved to the United Nations. This article will therefore examine why and how this apparently vital piece of international policy has stalled.
Levée en masse – the spontaneous uprising of the civilian population against an invading force – has long been a part of the modern law of armed conflict with regard to determining who may legitimately participate in armed conflict. The concept originated during the revolutionary wars in America and France, and was incorporated into the first codified rules of armed conflict. However, despite the prevalence of the category of levée en masse in the modern laws of armed conflict, there have been few, if any, instances of levée en masse taking place in modern armed conflicts. This article examines how and why the category of levée en masse developed. In doing so, this article situates the concept and evolution of levée en masse within the history of international humanitarian law more generally.