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Abstract

The history of arms control efforts in the Middle East consists of numerous initiatives, but very limited results. From the first efforts to negotiate WMD limits and non-proliferation arrangements in the 1960s, through various regional initiatives, frameworks, proposals, discussions, and negotiations, the obstacles to agreement on mutual limitations remained dominant. Frequent discussions in the UN of a Middle East Nuclear Free Zone (MENWFZ), the multi-lateral Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) talks initiated during the 1991 Middle East Peace Conference, and the regional dimensions of global frameworks such as the NPT, CWC, and CTBT have all failed to produce results.Detailed analysis of these efforts highlights the impact of realist security-based factors, the structure and process of the interactions, as well as the cultural and domestic political dimensions. The existential conflicts, reflected in protracted territorial disputes and denials of legitimacy and compounded by a fundamental asymmetry, created a zero-sum framework in the region. The region is characterized by a great deal of instability and competition; this situation, in turn, contributed to the efforts to acquire WMD. In terms of domestic politics, the regional cooperation required for arms limitation is often inconsistent with the dominant articulated political interests and regime perspectives. In addition, misunderstandings and misperceptions frequently occur due to the complexities of cross-cultural communications in the Middle East. Numerous dialogues have not narrowed the gaps or transformed the zero-sum frameworks into cooperative ones. Hopes for the creation of successful regional mechanisms for limiting arms depend on overcoming the obstacles encountered in past efforts.

In: International Negotiation
This work outlines available resources and proposed standards for international NGO fact-finding missions:
Chapter One presents an introduction to the issue of NGO fact-finding. Chapter Two discusses the problems caused by the lack of any generally-accepted guidelines for NGO fact-finding, in contrast with contexts where NGOs have achieved consensus. Chapter Three surveys proposed guidelines for human rights and humanitarian NGOs. In addition, this section examines United Nations fact-finding standards, as well as examples of internal fact-finding standards for major NGOs. Chapter Four analyzes the fact-finding standards used in five specific cases: the International Crisis Group (Kosovo, 1999), the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (Georgia, 2008), United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Mapping Exercise on the Democratic Republic of Congo (1993-2003), Conflict Analysis Resource Center/University London study on Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (Colombia, 1988-2004), and Human Rights Watch (Lebanon, 2006). The final chapter offers conclusions and recommendations.
In: Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Volume 46 (2016)
In: Best Practices for Human Rights and Humanitarian NGO Fact-Finding
In: Best Practices for Human Rights and Humanitarian NGO Fact-Finding
In: Best Practices for Human Rights and Humanitarian NGO Fact-Finding
In: Best Practices for Human Rights and Humanitarian NGO Fact-Finding
In: Best Practices for Human Rights and Humanitarian NGO Fact-Finding
In: Best Practices for Human Rights and Humanitarian NGO Fact-Finding