In this essay, I draw out some implications of a position called ‘Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism’, developed by Duncan Pritchard, for the theory and practice of interreligious communication. Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism (wqf) is based a reading of on Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. Its central claim is that all rational evaluation (and therefore all rational support) is essentially and inherently local: it cannot take place ‘wholesale’, but only relative to the so-called hinge commitments, which are unquestioned certainties that enable epistemic rationality to function at all. After setting out the main tenets of that position, I articulate what its theoretical and practical implications in this area would be if it were true: wqf makes understandable the areas which are, in interreligious discussions and dialogue, non-negotiable, while on the other hand, it also makes understandable that some beliefs and interpretations are matters for discussion. wqf also, however, enables some flexibility in that what is religiously indubitable at one point or in one context can become dubitable in another, perhaps interreligious context—or other way around. Building on this model, I sketch a new, Wittgensteinian model of interreligious communication in the final part of my essay, concluding with a number of suggestions for further theoretical work in this area.