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Multi-level analyses of the European Social Survey 2002
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Social capital is not only usefel for the person who owns it, but it may also foster the integration of a society and the stability of a democracy. Friendly relations, social trust and norms of reciprocity ease the living together in a society and encourage people to take part in democratic decision making. This volume examines the differences in levels, causes and consequences of social capital between 22 European countries surveyed in the 2002 European Social Survey. At first glance, social capital differs strongly between countries. Yet the determinants of social capital differ strongly between European people as well. If one takes account of the latter, the former may no longer appear so large. The volume asks whether this is indeed the case so that a similiarity of countries goes along with a diversity of people. To examine this, muliti-level analyses are used in each contribution.
Multi-level analyses of the European Social Survey 2002
Author:
Social capital is not only usefel for the person who owns it, but it may also foster the integration of a society and the stability of a democracy. Friendly relations, social trust and norms of reciprocity ease the living together in a society and encourage people to take part in democratic decision making. This volume examines the differences in levels, causes and consequences of social capital between 22 European countries surveyed in the 2002 European Social Survey. At first glance, social capital differs strongly between countries. Yet the determinants of social capital differ strongly between European people as well. If one takes account of the latter, the former may no longer appear so large. The volume asks whether this is indeed the case so that a similiarity of countries goes along with a diversity of people. To examine this, muliti-level analyses are used in each contribution.
The tendency of decreasing religiosity is explained by the theory of secularization through differentiation and pluralization. Using the ess 2002–2016, the impacts of both on church attendance and self-ascribed religiosity are tested, controlling for determinants of religiosity—that is, for belonging (cohort and denomination) and choice (education, urban residence, marriage, parenthood, and employment)—with multi-level models separating between- from within-country effects. Without controls, time negatively affects religiosity: there is a secularization tendency. But controlling for cohort and denomination annihilates this effect and strongly reduces individual-level as well as country-level error variances. Effects of belonging are stronger than those of choice, cohort succession has a negative effect, and religiosity differs between denominations. Differentiation and pluralization have only a few effects between countries and only one within countries such that secularization theory is not confirmed.
Christian convictions are investigated during the life course. As for causes during youth, a Christian socialization and good intergenerational relations in the family should have a positive impact – socialization and generational hypotheses. As for causes during the life course, personal attachments should have a positive, and success a negative impact – self-transcendence hypothesis; and experiences of illness and death should have a positive impact – crisis hypothesis. As for changes, a monotone increase of Christian convictions with age is expected – ageing hypothesis. The sample consists of 1301 former German high school students, first interviewed in 1969 at the age of 16, and again interviewed at the ages of 30, 43, and 56. The socialization hypothesis is confirmed according to most of its indicators, the remaining hypotheses are confirmed only in part.
Abstract
Between 2002 and 2016, church attendance and self-attributed religiosity declines linearly, if all countries included in the European Social Survey are taken together. This analysis differentiates within Europe between two ideological and three denominational divides. Two questions are examined. First, is secularization pervasive across these groups? Second, how pervasive does secularization remain as a macro-level trend, when cohort membership and other individual-level qualities are controlled for? We find that the trend in secularization is well-explained by cohort succession in Western as well as in Catholic and Protestant countries. In Eastern Orthodox countries, however, an increase in religiosity is observed, which cannot be explained by individual-level properties. We speculate that it is triggered by a coalition of national churches and political elites.