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Abstract
Negotiating with terrorists is possible, within limits, as the articles in this issue show and explore. Limits come initially in the distinction between absolute and contingent terrorists, and then between revolutionary and conditional absolutes and between barricaders, kidnappers and hijackers in the contingent category. Revolutionary absolute are nonnegotiable adversaries, but even conditional absolutes are potentially negotiable and contingent terrorists actually seek negotiation. The official negotiator is faced with the task of giving a little in order to get the terrorist to give a lot, a particularly difficult imbalance to obtain given the highly committed and desperate nature of terrorists as they follow rational but highly unconventional tactics. Such are the challenges of negotiating with terrorists that this issue of the journal explores and elucidates.
A mutually hurting stalemate is a necessary but insufficient condition for the opening of negotiations, direct or mediated. It is subject to perception, buffered by many insulating ploys even if it seems to exist objectively. Thus, the major challenge for a mediator in most cases is to ripen the parties’ perceptions. In addition to the attitudinal challenge, there are structural challenges posed by other types of stalemates and near-stalemates, which call for not only persuasion but also manipulation by the mediator. The ultimate challenge to a mediator is to move successful negotiations producing conflict management onto the consummating phase of negotiations for conflict resolution. But the first removes the incentive for the second, since it ceases the violence that is the most effective source of pain.
Saadia Touval’s important contributions to the study of mediation included an emphasis on the interests and motivations of mediators, hitherto often assumed to be pure or non-existent. As a result, legitimacy is usually considered to be inherent in the selfless mediator, although in internal affairs, mediation is illegitimate meddling. At the same time, much of the work on mediation either exaggerates or underestimates the nature of leverage. Public opinion also has an important but ambiguous relation to mediation. Interests, public opinion and leverage were topics where Touval helped to establish a more realistic appreciation, as illustrated in this second commemorative issue of International Negotiation.
Abstract
Case studies embody a deep knowledge of the subject and can be used to test or generate theoretical propositions for explaining negotiated outcomes. Their value is increased when they are employed comparatively, using a number of instances of negotiation – flawed or successful – in the same conflict or problem or a number of negotiations of different conflicts. While it might appear that statistical studies of large numbers of cases would be even more advantageous, these studies tend to lose the feel and understanding that comparative cases can command. Thus, comparative case studies lie at the crossroads of reality and theory; they present their evidence through the eyes of a knowledgeable specialist and they test it against the hypothetical constructs of a creative conceptualist. The challenge is as high as the payoffs.
Abstract
Negotiation is less taught than might be expected in International Relations (IR) programs. Yet an upper-level university course is needed to address three audiences: future citizens, diplomats, and scholars. Since there is no single theory of negotiations, such a course needs to address the various conceptual approaches, grouped as Behavioral, Processual, Integrative, Structural, and Strategic. Conceptual presentations need to be supplemented with practitioners’ testimonies, simulations, and case studies, the latter using participants’ accounts as well as analyses. Games and a sample syllabus are presented.
Abstract
This issue contains an examination of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations with an effort to break through the deadlock strategically. It analyzes the past record of failure and addresses the basic problem of asymmetry. Despite the solutions that have been advanced for all the specific issues, it is the forward-looking matter of trust that is the impediment to productive negotiations. The declaration of a Palestinian state and its recognition by the international community are now the basic elements necessary to break the asymmetry of the parties. A second element – allegedly favored by the Trump administration – is to reduce a symmetry by enlarging the playing field to include surrounding states, as proposed in the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative.
Abstract
This issue contains an examination of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations with an effort to break through the deadlock strategically. It analyzes the past record of failure and addresses the basic problem of asymmetry. Despite the solutions that have been advanced for all the specific issues, it is the forward-looking matter of trust that is the impediment to productive negotiations. The declaration of a Palestinian state and its recognition by the international community are now the basic elements necessary to break the asymmetry of the parties. A second element – allegedly favored by the Trump administration – is to reduce a symmetry by enlarging the playing field to include surrounding states, as proposed in the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative.
Abstract
The current context of increasing entropy in international politics poses challenges for negotiation and negotiation analysis. The current System of World Disorder contains defining characteristics that do not fit well with established negotiation concepts and practice. Following a few decades of progress in conflict management after the bipolar system, major regions of the world have seen dedicated attempts to bring conflicts under control in the current decade failing for lack of ripeness, trade-offs, reframing, mediation and support. New concepts and practices of negotiation are required to deal with the current vacua in international politics and their consequences.