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How does affect relate to time? This chapter offers a phenomenological perspective on the temporal character of affectivity. It argues that the past predominates, and that a concrete, ongoing history prevails within the embodied and embedded unfolding of affect. While affect happens in the present and instigates, pre-figures and transitions to the future, it is decisively anchored in what has been: in a materially sedimented past which continues to weigh on all practically conceivable ways of being. With reference to Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Fanon and contemporary feminist and anti-racist phenomenologists, I outline the contours of a temporal account of affectivity that foregrounds the past. Subsequently, I relate this outlook to Christina Sharpe’s powerful conceptual metaphor “the Wake,” suggesting that it is not historicity as such but a particular ongoing history of violent appropriation, oppression and displacement that keeps setting the tone for affective being-in-the-world in this day and age. Thereby, the present account makes tentative contact with a strand of work in black studies that is sometimes called “Afro-Pessimism.”

In: Phenomenology as Performative Exercise
Author:

Abstract

How does affect relate to time? This chapter offers a phenomenological perspective on the temporal character of affectivity. It argues that the past predominates, and that a concrete, ongoing history prevails within the embodied and embedded unfolding of affect. While affect happens in the present and instigates, pre-figures and transitions to the future, it is decisively anchored in what has been: in a materially sedimented past which continues to weigh on all practically conceivable ways of being. With reference to Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Fanon and contemporary feminist and anti-racist phenomenologists, I outline the contours of a temporal account of affectivity that foregrounds the past. Subsequently, I relate this outlook to Christina Sharpe’s powerful conceptual metaphor “the Wake,” suggesting that it is not historicity as such but a particular ongoing history of violent appropriation, oppression and displacement that keeps setting the tone for affective being-in-the-world in this day and age. Thereby, the present account makes tentative contact with a strand of work in black studies that is sometimes called “Afro-Pessimism.”

In: Phenomenology as Performative Exercise
Author:

Abstract

Philosophers of emotion tend to understand affective phenomena as individual mental states with intentional content. In this essay, I will contrast this with materials for an account of affectivity that construes affect as relational dynamics between individuals within social domains. ‘Relational affect’ does not refer to individual feeling states but to affective interactions in relational scenes, either between two or more interactants or between an agent and aspects of her environment. In developing this proposal, I draw on work in cultural affect studies and bring it in conversation with approaches to emotional intentionality in philosophy. In particular, I attempt to transpose parts of the normative-pragmatic approach to emotional intentionality developed by Bennett Helm into a transpersonal relational framework. I argue that this reorientation can help make visible micro-dynamics of affect in social settings that often have problematic political implications.

In: How to Do Things with Affects
Author:

Abstract

Philosophers of emotion tend to understand affective phenomena as individual mental states with intentional content. In this essay, I will contrast this with materials for an account of affectivity that construes affect as relational dynamics between individuals within social domains. ‘Relational affect’ does not refer to individual feeling states but to affective interactions in relational scenes, either between two or more interactants or between an agent and aspects of her environment. In developing this proposal, I draw on work in cultural affect studies and bring it in conversation with approaches to emotional intentionality in philosophy. In particular, I attempt to transpose parts of the normative-pragmatic approach to emotional intentionality developed by Bennett Helm into a transpersonal relational framework. I argue that this reorientation can help make visible micro-dynamics of affect in social settings that often have problematic political implications.

In: How to Do Things with Affects
In: Gefühl und Weltbezug
In: Gefühl und Weltbezug
In: Gefühl und Weltbezug
In: Gefühl und Weltbezug
In: Gefühl und Weltbezug
In: Gefühl und Weltbezug