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  • Author or Editor: Jeroen de Ridder x

Jeroen de Ridder

Veel wetenschappers, filosofen en theologen zijn van mening dat God nooit opgevoerd mag worden als verklaring voor een verschijnsel. Eén argument dat ze hiervoor aandragen is dat het op de een of andere manier in de aard van wetenschap zit dat God er geen rol in kan spelen. In dit artikel ga ik in op een specifieke versie van dit argument. Ik vraag me af of de aard van wetenschappelijke verklaringen uitsluit dat God als verklaringsgrond wordt genoemd. Om die vraag te beantwoorden ga ik na of de door wetenschapsfilosofen ontwikkelde standaardmodellen van wetenschappelijk verklaren ruimte bieden aan theïstische verklaringen. Dat blijkt inderdaad zo te zijn, enige kwalificaties daargelaten. De conclusie moet dan ook luiden dat de aard van wetenschappelijke verklaringen niet zodanig is dat theïstische verklaringen uitgesloten zijn.

Jeroen de Ridder

Book Reviews Jacob Klapwijk, Purpose in the living world? (R. Clouser) Bradley Monton, Seeking God in Science: An Atheist Defends Intelligent Design (J. de Ridder) Alvin Plantinga and Michael Tooley, Knowledge of God (J. de Ridder) Nicholas Wolterstorff, Justice: Rights and Wrongs (A. Soeteman)

Jeroen de Ridder

Book Reviews Jacob Klapwijk, Purpose in the living world? (R. Clouser) Bradley Monton, Seeking God in Science: An Atheist Defends Intelligent Design (J. de Ridder) Alvin Plantinga and Michael Tooley, Knowledge of God (J. de Ridder) Nicholas Wolterstorff, Justice: Rights and Wrongs (A. Soeteman)

Jeroen de Ridder

Much of Alvin Plantinga’s Where the Conflict Really Lies(2011) will contain few surprises for those who have been following his work over the past decades. This —I hasten to add — is nothing against the book. The fact alone that his ideas on various topics, which have appeared scattered throughout the literature, are now actualized, applied to the debate about the (alleged) conflict between science and religion, and organized into an overarching argument with a single focus makes this book worthwhile. Moreover, I see this book making significant progress on two opposite ends of the spectrum of views about science and religion. On the one end, we find the so-called new atheists and other conflict-mongers. Compared to the overheated rhetoric that oozes from their writings, this book is a breath of fresh air. Plantinga cuts right to the chase and soberly exposes the bare bones of the new atheists’ arguments. It immediately becomes clear how embarrassingly bare these bones really are. On the other end of the spectrum are theologians and scientists who envisage harmony and concord between science and religion.

Jeroen de Ridder

Discussions about the relationship between science and religion have never been absent from the public arena, but they seem to have made something of a comeback in the past decade or two. It is hard to say what accounts for such large-scale developments in society. Perhaps it has something to do with the fact that it has become increasingly clear that the secularization thesis, i.e., the claim that the modernization and rationalization of societies goes hand in hand with the gradual disappearance of religion, must be put to rest at the graveyard of disconfirmed sociological predictions. Religion is here to stay, it now appears. Thoroughly secularized societies like those we find in Western Europe may be exceptional rather than exemplary.

Gerrit Glas, Jeroen de Ridder and Mathanja Berger

Gerrit Glas, Jeroen de Ridder and Mathanja Berger

Design Hypotheses Behave Like Skeptical Hypotheses

(or: Why We Can’t Know the Falsity of Design Hypotheses)

René van Woudenberg and Jeroen de Ridder

It is often claimed that, as a result of scientific progress, we now know that the natural world displays no design. Although we have no interest in defending design hypotheses, we will argue that establishing claims to the effect that we know the denials of design hypotheses is more difficult than it seems. We do so by issuing two skeptical challenges to design-deniers. The first challenge draws inspiration from radical skepticism and shows how design claims are at least as compelling as radical skeptical scenarios in undermining knowledge claims, and in fact probably more so. The second challenge takes its cue from skeptical theism and shows how we are typically not in an epistemic position to rule out design.