There are two streams of reception of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion and his contributions to interreligious communication. On the one hand, his contributions are greatly appreciated because he seems to be in favor of religious pluralism, highlighting and appreciating differences and diversities. On the other hand, this respect seems to be grounded in Wittgenstein’s disrespect for the cognitive dimension of religious beliefs. In most interpretations of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, this critical attitude towards theories in the realm of religion has been understood as a defense of a non-cognitivist interpretation of theology. However, Wittgenstein’s critique of ‘theories’ does not concern religions only but also philosophy as such and has roots in a specific understanding of philosophy and of religious language. In my contribution I try to develop a closer look at Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, in which I will argue for the possibility of a cognitivist interpretation of religious beliefs. This interpretation will open up a peculiar dimension of interreligious communication through a sensitivity for the expressive dimension of religious beliefs. The awareness of favourable attitudes towards religious beliefs, rather than a cognitive disrespect of them, is the foundation of the method of comparative theology which I develop in the last part of the essay.