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Preceding the 2015/16 refugee “crisis”, aid conditionality and visa relaxation topped the list of leverages at the EUs disposal to enlist third-country cooperation in the fight against irregular migration. To correct some shortcomings of its resettlement policy, in particular the low intakes, the EU in the Jordan Compact experiments with keeping refugees employed abroad instead. In what is known as the EU-Jordan Compact, rules of origin under the wto Generalized System of Preferences (gsp) are relaxed on goods produced with refugee labor to compensate Jordan for issuing work permits to keep Syrian refugees close to home. This chapter discusses the Jordan Compact as an example of a “multidimensional” migration policy which interconnects three policy frames—EU trade-for-all strategy, the European Agenda on Migration’s Partnership Priorities and revised Neighbourhood Policy, but fails to qualify for multi-level governance (mlg) due to incoherence with wto and EU law. Drawing on a sub-set of regime theory, issue-linkage, we argue that the Compact, “new” approach of turning “crisis into a development opportunity”, is instead about experimenting with trade conditionality as a way to change the quality of the EU enp level-playing-field, the mobility paradigm of the EU gamm and the market-based preferentialism of the EU/wto Everything-but-Arms scheme into what becomes a one-time exception. Hailed for its humanitarian livelihood programming’, the implementation of the Compact in practice transforms a “development opportunity” into another deterrence strategy—not ex post, through readmission agreements, but ex ante, through work permits.
Abstract
The World Trade Organization Appellate Body has drawn from international legal principles to intensify the normative impact of good faith duties vaguely described in Articles 3(10) and 4(3) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. In the context of the Appellate Body's repeated rejection of good faith principles in the “substantive” WTO law of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the General Agreement on Trade in Services and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, the development of “procedural” good faith adjudication stands out. Relating procedural good faith adjudication to the level of fairness, the WTO judiciary thus relegates to the past power-oriented, diplomacy-based structures of WTO dispute settlement.This article will show how the general good faith principle served to reduce the flexibility remaining in the WTO's Member-driven dispute settlement procedure, often abused by powerful WTO Members to draw out disputes at the expense of developing country Members. One will also describe how the Appellate Body derived a due process standard, the one of requiring a “fair, prompt and effective” resolution of WTO trade disputes from the good faith obligation in Article 3(10) DSU, while keeping due process distinct from good faith duties.This due process standard enables the Appellate Body to review (and restrict) the use of procedural rights by WTO Members even when the exercise of these rights appears – on its face – consistent with DSU norms.The article finds that the due process standard is a first-time judicial assertion in Appellate Body practice of a broader enforceability of good faith.