Author: Mark E. Blum

Abstract

Contrary to Paul Ricoeur’s claim that there is an unbridgeable chasm between phenomenological time and historical time, my studies have shown me that the former is the cognitive foundation for the latter. The temporality formed in each sentential judgment can be discerned through a stylistic analysis of its grammar. This grammatical foundation which is established at the pre-reflective level of sentence formation becomes a basis in the maturing individual for conceptual preferences. How experience is organized informally and consequently reflected upon in the everyday judgment, or more formally in the writing of history, are outcomes of this grammatical logic. What I term one’s ‘historical logic’ differs in categorically interesting ways in each person; for each person it is an invariant grammatical organization that guides attended experience informing a person’s sense of ‘history’ and its meaning over a career of thought. The grammatical organization itself stems from varying part-whole organizations that perceptually provide the form grammar then instantiates. The epistemological basis of my approach is developed from Kant and Edmund Husserl insofar as their conceptions of temporal generation in judgment. My grammatical analyses rely upon the transformational grammar of Noam Chomsky.

In this essay, I show the invariant character of two distinct historical logics through the careers of thought of two Tudor-Stuart historians, G.R. Elton and his student Arthur Joseph Slavin, and two Tudor-Stuart personalities, Edward Coke and Francis Bacon. I have found historical logics to be intergenerational. Forms of historical logic are more than likely psycho-genetic, recurring in every generation. I have provided evidence for this claim in studies I have made of adolescents who have first come to master the well-formed sentence in personal expression.

Among the implications of the findings here are that ‘objectivity’ as well as ‘historical objectivity’ are better understood as ‘multiply valid’ among the judgments of equally informed and keen observers and interpreters. There is an unbridgeable foundation that differentiates one person’s conception of temporal organization from another. Synthetically, we are separated in our judgments, even when we can arrive at analytical understandings of these differences.

In: Journal of the Philosophy of History
Author: Mark E. Blum

Otto Bauer (1881–1938) has emerged once more in the thought of Western Marxists. The dominant theoretical voice of the Austrian Social Democrats in the late Austrian-Hungarian Empire and the First Austrian Republic, Bauer was re-examined in the 1970s and ’80s as ‘the third way’ was being explored in European politics by Eurocommunists. Bauer again is being discussed in the twenty-first century as not only a European ‘third way’, but as a model for nations across the globe. Bauer’s vision theoretically as well as tactically between and 1934, when Austrian fascism ended the political efforts of Austrian Social Democracy, was of a pluralist parliamentary governance that sought through party coalitions and the influence of social experiment a developing societal praxis whose socialist principles would realise eventually Marx’s understanding of a classless society. A gradualism in long-range strategy and tactics would lead democratically to greater collective coexistence embracing differing cultures within and beyond separate nations. Reviewed here are five publications between 2005 and 2011 which are either thoughtfully supportive or critically dismissive of Bauer’s multi-cultural models for the socialist coexistence of communities and nations. Two conference collections and three books on Bauer’s thought and political life enable the contemporary mind to evaluate the seminal promise of Bauer’s Marxist understanding, where for him Marxism was a social-scientific instrument to guide societal development.

In: Historical Materialism
A Contribution to the Differentiation of the Sociological and the Juristic Method
Author: Max Adler
Editor: Mark E. Blum
This translation of Max Adler’s Die Staatsauffassung des Marxismus enables English readers to know a significant perspective on Marx’s theory of the state, which was central to the interwar period in which he was writing (1922). In an extended dialogue with democratic jurist Hans Kelsen, Adler shows that the so-called necessity of law as the neutral arbiter of a democratic society has been heretofore a flawed imposition of the authoritative understandings of the ruling classes. Adler’s brings to his argument the Kantian concept of “sociation”, where every human judgment perforce sets its determinations within its view of the social whole, demonstrating that an accurate comprehension of interdependent equality that realizes an objective “sociation” can only occur in a “classless” society.
In: Austro-Marxism: The Ideology of Unity. Volume II
In: Austro-Marxism: The Ideology of Unity. Volume II
In: Austro-Marxism: The Ideology of Unity. Volume II
In: Austro-Marxism: The Ideology of Unity. Volume II
In: Austro-Marxism: The Ideology of Unity. Volume II
In: Austro-Marxism: The Ideology of Unity. Volume II