Mills' paper tackles an important question for Jungian studies: what are the underlying metaphysical assumptions behind analytical psychology? However, his attempt to pursue this inquiry is undermined by a strong but unsupportable insistence by Mills that Jung intended to present himself primarily as an ontologist. I also argue that various further inaccuracies and misreadings lead Mills into a fundamental misunderstanding of the intentions and aims that characterise Jung's psychology.
Two tendencies co-exist within the field of analytical psychology. The first is to locate Jung’s psychology within the established bounds of official science (by for example insisting on its implicit consistency with orthodox scientific findings). The second is to make claims that Jung’s psychology is extra- (or super-) scientific. It seems to me however that neither approach can do justice to the difficulty of the problem Jung has set us. In order to develop a third approach I place Jung’s problematic engagement with science into a creative encounter with the philosophical ideas of Deleuze & Guattari. The French philosophers distinguish two contrasting ways of doing science: “Royal” or “state” science privileges the fixed, stable and constant. “Nomad” or “minor” science emphasizes the malleable, fluid, and metamorphic nature of being. These are not alternatives but “ontologically, a single field of interaction” (Deleuze & Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 367). When it comes to Jung’s writings on science, the irredeemable ambiguity of his psychology shows up in what appear to be two contradictory approaches. One highlights the intrinsically scientific nature of his project and insists upon his empiricism. The other takes the form of a profound and relentless critique of the materialistic, reductive and rationalistic assumptions Jung finds behind the scientific approach. My suggestion here is that the dynamic tension between these two opposing visions of science that forms the crucial condition for the on-going individuation of his psychology.
Jung's psychology is founded upon this problem: ‘Somewhere deep in the background I always knew that I was two persons’ (Jung & Jaffé, , pp. 61–62). I intend to read the disquieting tension of this problematic as haunting everything he wrote. My thesis is that Jung's perspective is both enchanted and disenchanted and, moreover, that this antinomial tension makes him and his psychology peculiarly modern. Utilising recent scholarship on the modern occult, which has placed enchantment at the centre of modernity, this paper argues for a peculiarly modern disenchanted enchantment that Jung's psychology both exemplifies and explores.