While animal welfare is commonly invoked in legal debates regarding non-human animals kept for food purposes, the concept of animal joy is rarely mentioned in such contexts. This paper analyzes the relationship between welfare and joy in the German animal protection law (gapl) and in the eu directive 98/58/ec. Based on a review of scientific and philosophical approaches towards animal welfare, joy is argued to be a part of welfare. Nevertheless, joy is ignored in the German and eu legal provisions. While there may be economic disadvantages of legally protecting animal joy, it is argued that overlooking elements of joy cannot be justified from any ethical perspective that claims to take animal welfare into consideration. In order to clarify the aims of the legal provisions, decision-makers need to define the role joy ought to play in welfare legislation.
Philipp von Gall and Mickey Gjerris
A Critical Analysis of Tom Regan’s Principle of Harm
Külli Keerus, Mickey Gjerris and Helena Röcklinsberg
Tom Regan encapsulated his principle of harm as a prima facie direct duty not to harm experiencing subjects of a life. However, his consideration of harm as deprivation, one example of which is loss of freedom, can easily be interpreted as a harm, which may not be experienced by its subject. This creates a gap between Regan’s criterion for moral status and his account of what our duties are. However, in comparison with three basic paradigms of welfare known in nonhuman animal welfare science, Regan’s understanding coheres with a modified version of a feelings-based paradigm: not only the immediate feelings of satisfaction, but also future opportunities to have such feelings, must be taken into account. Such an interpretation is compatible with Regan’s understanding of harm as deprivation. The potential source of confusion, however, lies in Regan’s own possible argumentative mistakes.