Search Results
The power of biomedical technology lies not only in treating diseases and relieving pain, but also in intervening in our bodies at the molecular level in a way that makes us wonder if this is (re)shaping our very human nature. This technology raises ethical, philosophical and religious questions related to understanding and identifying our essential humanity, that which is “uniquely human” in us, and how far genetic interventions in our human bodies may affect all this. Biomedical developments and their associated philosophical and religious dilemmas shed new lights on old questions like: What makes us distinctively human? Why is human life sacred? When does human life begin? What makes an individual eligible to certain rights? How would the answers to these questions determine the optimal way to deal with a human being throughout the various stages of his/her lifespan?
All the previous questions were usually linked to the classical topic of abortion, but modern biomedical technology expanded the reproduction possibilities in unprecedented ways. This new situation puts humans in front of a new and increasing list of options and alternatives, including striking ones like the so-called “liberal eugenics”. These developments make the decision-making process about these issues quite complex because one’s moral world, consisting of basic moral assumptions and convictions, does not always have readymade and clear-cut answers about these questions. This holds true to both the deliberations taking place among Western philosophers like Habermas and the parallel discussions in the Islamic tradition.
This chapter will tackle the above-mentioned questions by examining first the moral status of biomedical technology itself and understanding the different perceptions of its potential among philosophers and Muslim jurists. Further, the chapter will discuss the philosophical and jurisprudential perceptions of human beings and human life; and the identification of the key ethical dilemmas raised by modern biomedical technology, as epitomized by genetic intervention.
Contributors
Faqihuddin Abdul Kodir, Nuha Alshaar, Safwan Amir, Khairil Husaini Bin Jamil, Pieter Coppens, Chafik Graiguer, M. Imran Khan, Mutaz al-Khatib, Salahudheen Kozhithodi and Ali Altaf Mian.
المساهمون
شفيق اكّريكّر، وصفوان أمير، وخَيرئيل حسيني بن جميل، ومحمد عمران خان، ومعتز الخطيب، ونهى الشعار، وفقيه الدين عبد القدير، وپيتر كوپنس، وصلاح الدين كوزيتودي، وعلي ألطاف ميان.
Contributors
Faqihuddin Abdul Kodir, Nuha Alshaar, Safwan Amir, Khairil Husaini Bin Jamil, Pieter Coppens, Chafik Graiguer, M. Imran Khan, Mutaz al-Khatib, Salahudheen Kozhithodi and Ali Altaf Mian.
المساهمون
شفيق اكّريكّر، وصفوان أمير، وخَيرئيل حسيني بن جميل، ومحمد عمران خان، ومعتز الخطيب، ونهى الشعار، وفقيه الدين عبد القدير، وپيتر كوپنس، وصلاح الدين كوزيتودي، وعلي ألطاف ميان.
Abstract
In this chapter, I explore the authority of the heart (qalb) as a potential locus for individual moral knowledge and normativity in Islamic ethics. To do so, I discuss two ḥadīths that ostensibly suggest one’s “self” as a source of moral judgment. These ḥadīths raise renewed questions about the sources of moral judgment, the nature of moral judgment, and the ethical capacity of the “self” (conscience) – “consult your heart and consult your self …”; “righteousness is good conduct, and sin is that which rankles in your chest and which you would hate for other people to look upon.” There are rich debates in the Islamic tradition on the place and authority of the bāṭin (inward) in generating moral knowledge, which correspond to contemporary discourses in Western ethics on the conscience’s place in the moral formation of the individual. I argue that although the Islamic legal tradition as a discipline has focused on qualified external actions of individuals and the ijtihād (independent legal reasoning) of mujtahids (jurists), it did not ignore the authority of the bāṭin for moral assessment and the ijtihād of common individuals. I propose that the inward dimension has always occupied an important space within the interdisciplinary field of Islamic ethics, but has been overshadowed by the overarching theological disputes between the Muʿtazilīs and Ashʿarīs over sources of knowledge.
The chapter starts by exploring the relevant aḥādīth (reports) and their interpretation in ḥadīth commentaries, followed by an analysis of discussions in the fields of Islamic jurisprudence and Sufism.
Abstract
This chapter lays out the foundations for ḥadīth-based ethics as a sub-discipline of Islamic ethics, and provides the theoretical ground for the following chapters that tackle some of the issues in this emerging field. It does so through four distinct sections. The first presents a critical review of the relationship between ḥadīth and ethics in the contemporary scholarship on Islamic ethics since the beginning of the twentieth century. The second discusses the value of ḥadīth as a corpus on ethics, while the third attempts to conceptualise ḥadīth-based ethics and classify relevant works and, finally, the fourth section concludes with the suggested key themes and issues in this emerging discipline to be studied in the future.
Contributors: Mutaz al-Khatib, Mostafa Amakdouf, Mohamed Amine Brahimi, Assia Chekireb, Abdelmounim Choqairi, Issam Eido, Hicham El Makki, Amin El-Yousfi, Adil Et-Tahiri, Ramon Harvey, Mohammed Hashas, Eva Kepplinger, Mohamed Ourya, Harald Viersen.
المساهمون: مصطفى أمقدوف، محمد أوريا، محمد أمين البراهمي، محمد حصحاص، معتز الخطيب، عبد المنعم الشقيري، آسيا شكيرب، عادل الطاهري، عصام عيدو، هارالد فيرسن، إيفا كابلينغر، هشام المكي، رامون هارفي، أمين اليوسفي.
Contributors: Mutaz al-Khatib, Mostafa Amakdouf, Mohamed Amine Brahimi, Assia Chekireb, Abdelmounim Choqairi, Issam Eido, Hicham El Makki, Amin El-Yousfi, Adil Et-Tahiri, Ramon Harvey, Mohammed Hashas, Eva Kepplinger, Mohamed Ourya, Harald Viersen.
المساهمون: مصطفى أمقدوف، محمد أوريا، محمد أمين البراهمي، محمد حصحاص، معتز الخطيب، عبد المنعم الشقيري، آسيا شكيرب، عادل الطاهري، عصام عيدو، هارالد فيرسن، إيفا كابلينغر، هشام المكي، رامون هارفي، أمين اليوسفي.