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Abstract
This chapter provides an overview of how the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (asean) has responded to human protection issues such as human rights, mass atrocities prevention, and civilian protection in armed conflicts. It examines the evolution and dynamics of asean’s regionalism and the factors that shaped and transformed its norms. While asean has adopted the language of human security and human protection, traditional norms of sovereignty and non-interference remain sticky. The pluralist nature of asean also limits the organization from responding effectively to crisis situations within member states such as identity-based conflicts. However, there are also opportunities for continuing engagement on human protection issues with various stakeholders at the regional and domestic levels. Some asean member states are more open to mainstreaming the principle of Responsibility to Protect in the agenda of asean and recognize the importance of building the capacity of member states in preventing mass atrocities.
Abstract
Since the adoption of the asean Charter in 2008, the friction between the group’s traditional norms of sovereignty and non-interference and its people-oriented principles upholding universal norms such as human rights has become more pronounced in the case of Myanmar. This chapter examines asean’s diplomacy in dealing with Myanmar’s human rights protection issues. It argues that although in practice asean has put aside its non-interference principle in response to human protection problems within Myanmar including the crisis in Rakhine, the organisation’s collective efforts have been rebuffed by the previous military junta and the current civilian government which also invoked the same principle in protecting its sovereignty. While there are increasing calls from some asean members and other non-state actors in the region to consider relaxing the non-interference principle when it comes to humanitarian crisis issues affecting the region, it appears that reaching a consensus on this within the group would be extremely difficult given the strong resistance of some members to the idea.
This article provides an overview of how the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (asean) has responded to human protection issues such as human rights, mass atrocities prevention, and civilian protection in armed conflicts. It examines the evolution and dynamics of asean’s regionalism and the factors that shaped and transformed its norms. While asean has adopted the language of human security and human protection, traditional norms of sovereignty and non-interference remain sticky. The pluralist nature of asean also limits the organization from responding effectively to crisis situations within member states such as identity-based conflicts. However, there are also opportunities for continuing engagement on human protection issues with various stakeholders at the regional and domestic levels. Some asean member states are more open to mainstreaming the principle of Responsibility to Protect in the agenda of asean and recognize the importance of building the capacity of member states in preventing mass atrocities.
Abstract
asean has not collectively responded to the Rakhine crisis since 2017 from the perspective of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle and has failed to put a stop to the atrocities against the Rohingyas in Myanmar. This article argues that there is less support in the region for invoking the non-interference principle in dealing with Myanmar on the Rohingya issue even as some members have called for its relaxation and use of constructive engagement instead. As international pressure in pursuit of justice and accountability increased, so did calls from within the region for asean to do more beyond just providing humanitarian assistance to affected communities in Rakhine. Even so, asean consciously avoids pressing too hard on the issue of accountability as this could force the government and the military in Myanmar to totally disengage with asean and the international community on the Rakhine crisis, as well as push Nay Pyi Daw further into China’s embrace and thus undermine asean’s strategic interests in the region.
Two years since the arsa attacks and the military’s clearing operations in Rakhine, violence and continuing atrocities are being committed by the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Army) against the Rohingya and Arakanese civilians in Myanmar. This article examines the developments since August 2017 and the continuing failure of the international community to adequately respond to human rights violations and humanitarian needs of conflict-affected communities inside and outside of Myanmar. The article argues that despite the strong international outrage against the Tatmadaw’s atrocities, the international community’s failure to act springs from three main factors. First, the United Nations remains divided in response to the crisis as a result of ongoing systemic and structural deficiencies. Second, there is a lack of political will on the part of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (asean) to collectively impose sanctions against an erring member. Finally, the ongoing full autonomy of the Tatmadaw to operate above the law and remain unaccountable for continuing atrocities in the country. Their autonomy is facilitated by a precarious democratic transition led by Aung San Suu Kyi who appears more concerned about domestic repercussions of giving in to international pressure than about her tarnished reputation as a human rights defender. This article details the ongoing humanitarian needs of affected communities within and outside the country.
Abstract
This article examines how atrocity prevention efforts have had a limited effect on the violence and atrocities being committed in Myanmar. Myanmar’s military forces, the Tatmadaw, remain free to commit atrocities against vulnerable populations in the country, particularly against the Rohingya minority in Rakhine state. These efforts have been stymied at both the international and regional levels, especially now that the Tatmadaw rule the country following a coup d’etat in February 2021. UN efforts have fallen short as the Tatmadaw refuse to cooperate with the international community due to a lack of trust in UN processes and a subsequent siege mentality over heightened international outrage over the treatment of both the Rohingyas and protesters against the coup. Prevention efforts through asean, of which Myanmar is a member, have also fallen short. This is due primarily to a lack of accountability for erring members, and a long-standing principle of non-interference in members’ domestic affairs. Currently, there are no incentives for the Tatmadaw to negotiate and stop the violence committed against their own people. Indeed, the failure of these prevention efforts and the increased notions of nationalism they foster may be used by the Tatmadaw to continue their current policies of isolation and maintain power.
Abstract
This article examines the use of hate speech and incitement by perpetrators of violence and atrocities in Myanmar against vulnerable populations like the Rohingya community from the outbreak of communal conflict in Rakhine in 2012 to the post-February 2021 coup. It argues that there is a clear link between hate speech and incitement, on one hand, and the escalation of violent attacks against the Rohingya and other ethnic minorities in the country, which presaged the atrocities committed by security forces. It draws some implications for R2P and atrocities prevention from the Myanmar case study, which includes the flawed democratisation process initiated by the military and the manifest failure of both the usdp and nld governments to uphold their primary responsibility to protect vulnerable populations in the country. As well, the international community led by the United Nations and asean have both failed in their responsibility to respond in a timely and decisive manner to protect the Rohingya from genocide as well as the larger civilian population from the junta’s violent crackdown after the February 2021 coup.
Abstract
This article unpacks the normative and structural challenges facing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (asean) in responding to and preventing atrocity crimes, focusing on Myanmar. It argues that asean has been ineffective in dealing with the atrocities occurring in Myanmar, particularly after the 2021 coup, due to its adherence to its traditional norms and the “asean Way”. However, faced with the defiance of the junta in Myanmar, asean leaders may be forced to move away from its non-interference principle, and should in fact consider difficult options such as suspension of Myanmar membership in the organisation. By adopting the principle of non-indifference and holding the Myanmar military accountable for its continuing atrocities against civilians, asean could strengthen its credibility not just before the international community but, more importantly, among the people of Myanmar who are no longer willing to tolerate a return to military rule and impunity by security forces.