This study covers the socio-political, intellectual and institutional dynamics of underground resistance to the Allied occupation in Istanbul. The city was clearly not the seat of treason against the Nationalist struggle for independence, nor was collaboration with the occupiers what it was made out to be in Republican historiography. Above and beyond the international conjuncture in post-WWI Europe, factors that helped the Turkish Nationalists to succeed were: inter-Allied rivalries in the Near East that carried over to Istanbul; the British, French and Italians as major occupation forces, failing to establish a balance of strenght among themselves in their haste to promote respective national interests; the victors underestimating the defeated as they were engrossed with bureaucracy and were assailed by the influx of Russian refugees, Bolshevik propaganda, and the Turkish left.
Nearly all of the previous scholarship on Turkey and U.S. relations cover the Cold War period as well as current affairs with regard to security, strategy, and defense. Hence, the literature abounds with military orientation. This edited volume builds on a historical perspective and focuses on foreign relations, diplomacy, actors, mutual perceptions and reciprocity in diplomatic relations within the framework of the world conjuncture in the 1920s and 1930s. Relations with the U.S.A. have served as a balance in Turkey's Euro-Atlantic policy long before NATO was established. Likewise, re-building relations with the Republic of Turkey served U.S. interests in opening to the Near East and thus breaking away from its much lauded isolationist policy between the two world wars. Thus, the picture that emerges here is just as much a history of U.S. diplomacy as it is of Turkey.