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  • Author or Editor: Olga Tellegen-Couperus x
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In: Tilburg Law Review
In: Law and Religion in the Roman Republic
In: Law and Religion in the Roman Republic
In: Law and Religion in the Roman Republic
In: Law and Religion in the Roman Republic
In: Law and Religion in the Roman Republic

Abstract

It is generally assumed that from 367 BC the praetor was charged with iurisdictio, i.e. the supervision of civil litigation, and that, before that time, this task was performed by some other magistrate. Pontiffs were legal experts who served as advisers. However, new research has shown that the praetor originally had military duties and that it was only around 200 BC that he became involved in administering the law. In this paper the author suggests that, up to 200 BC, it was the College of Pontiffs which was responsible for supervising civil litigation. Mitchell put forward a similar hypothesis a few years ago, but so far he failed to convince his readers. In the author's view, close reading of Pomp. D. 1,2,2,6 and appreciating the fact that around 200 BC the relationship between pontiffs and magistrates changed fundamentally indicate that, before that year, the pontiffs were directly involved in civil litigation and were more than simply advisers.

In: Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis / Revue d'histoire du droit / The Legal History Review
Over the past two hundred plus years, scholarship has admired Roman law for being the first autonomous legal science in history. This biased view has obscured the fact that, traditionally, law was closely connected to religion and remained so well into the Empire. Building on a variety of sources – epigraphic, legal, literary, and numismatic – this book discloses how law and religion shared the same patrons (magistrates and priests) and a common goal (to deal with life’s uncertainties), and how, from the third century B.C., they underwent a process of rationalization. Today, Roman law and religion deserve our admiration because together they supported and consolidated the growing power of Rome.

Abstract

In D. 9,2,44pr., Ulpian states that, under the lex Aquilia, even the slightest fault (levissima culpa) counts. Since the time of the glossators, this phrase has been regarded as a general rule. Only one Romanist, MacCormack, has interpreted the phrase in a narrow sense: in his view, culpa levissima only referred to the case of scientia domini mentioned in section 1 of Ulpian's text. Later, Gimenez-Candela has argued that scientia domini led to direct liability only in case of damnum iniuria datum. The author aims to prove that culpa levissima only referred to scientia domini but that, on the other hand, scientia domini led to direct liability in all delicts.

In: Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis / Revue d'histoire du droit / The Legal History Review