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Series Editor:
Paul Cobben
This peer-reviewed series publishes volumes on the tradition of German Idealism in the broad sense. It is not only oriented to critical studies on the works of authors who belong to this tradition, but also to the later influence of these works. This means that the series pays attention both to the history of the reception of German Idealism, and to studies that provide in the systematic development of central themes that are formulated by this tradition.
The series published an average of 2,5 volumes per year over the last 5 years.
The series published an average of 2,5 volumes per year over the last 5 years.
Freedom as Overcoming the Fear of Death
In
The Paradigm of Recognition. Freedom as Overcoming the Fear of Death Paul Cobben defends the position that Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit contains all the building blocks to elaborate a paradigm of recognition which fundamentally criticizes the contemporary versions of Habermas, Rawls and Honneth. In his concept of recognition, the fear of death is the central category to understand the mediation between freedom and nature. Cobben not only systematically reconstructs how this view results from Hegel’s criticism of Hume and Kant, but also shows how Hegel’s three-part division of social freedom is based on this mediation. Therefore, Honneth wrongly thinks that his three forms of social freedom (related to love, respect and solidarity) correspond to Hegel’s three-part division.
Freedom as Overcoming the Fear of Death
In
The Paradigm of Recognition. Freedom as Overcoming the Fear of Death Paul Cobben defends the position that Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit contains all the building blocks to elaborate a paradigm of recognition which fundamentally criticizes the contemporary versions of Habermas, Rawls and Honneth. In his concept of recognition, the fear of death is the central category to understand the mediation between freedom and nature. Cobben not only systematically reconstructs how this view results from Hegel’s criticism of Hume and Kant, but also shows how Hegel’s three-part division of social freedom is based on this mediation. Therefore, Honneth wrongly thinks that his three forms of social freedom (related to love, respect and solidarity) correspond to Hegel’s three-part division.