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Abstract
The thesis that each paragraph of the three parts of the logic in the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences can be related to the development in the beginning initial chapters of the Phenomenology of Spirit (Consciousness, Self-Consciousness and Reason) is problematic insofar as it is not immediately clear how the logic of essence matches the Self-Conscious-Chapter of the Phenomenology. This chapter is characterized by the attempt to reconcile pure Self-Consciousness with the reality of life. The logic of essence, however, develops the realization of the essence. In this development the concept of life has no place. The development rather seems to refer to a concept of being that belongs to lifeless nature.
The article shows that this problem can be solved if the development of the Self-Conscious-Chapter is understood as the self-conscious repetition of the development in the Conscious-Chapter. Although lifeless nature plays its role in the appearing consciousness of the Conscious-Chapter and life plays its role in the appearing consciousness of the Self-Conscious-Chapter, both the logical structure of these chapters, and the development of the logic of being and the logic of essence (including its categories of relation) do not immediately concern the logic of lifeless nature and life.
Series Editor:
This peer-reviewed series publishes volumes on the tradition of German Idealism in the broad sense. It is not only oriented to critical studies on the works of authors who belong to this tradition, but also to the later influence of these works. This means that the series pays attention both to the history of the reception of German Idealism, and to studies that provide in the systematic development of central themes that are formulated by this tradition.
Rethinking Marx’s Criticism of Capitalism
Marx’s analysis of the commodity results in his conception of Capital as substance in the form of alienation. While Hegel claims that substance can be understood as the realization of freedom, Marx shows this freedom to be alienated labor: abstract labor, which Marx identifies as the capitalist conception of value. The book clarifies why Marx’s so-called materialist criticism of Hegel can be conceived of as an immanent criticism of Hegel: Marx’s criticism explicates that the realization of freedom in the Philosophy of Right contradicts Hegel’s basic point of departure. The adequate realization of freedom not only leads to an alternative (non-alienated) conception of value, but also explains why this conception of value is fully compatible with the free market.
Rethinking Marx’s Criticism of Capitalism
Marx’s analysis of the commodity results in his conception of Capital as substance in the form of alienation. While Hegel claims that substance can be understood as the realization of freedom, Marx shows this freedom to be alienated labor: abstract labor, which Marx identifies as the capitalist conception of value. The book clarifies why Marx’s so-called materialist criticism of Hegel can be conceived of as an immanent criticism of Hegel: Marx’s criticism explicates that the realization of freedom in the Philosophy of Right contradicts Hegel’s basic point of departure. The adequate realization of freedom not only leads to an alternative (non-alienated) conception of value, but also explains why this conception of value is fully compatible with the free market.
Freedom as Overcoming the Fear of Death
In The Paradigm of Recognition. Freedom as Overcoming the Fear of Death Paul Cobben defends the position that Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit contains all the building blocks to elaborate a paradigm of recognition which fundamentally criticizes the contemporary versions of Habermas, Rawls and Honneth. In his concept of recognition, the fear of death is the central category to understand the mediation between freedom and nature. Cobben not only systematically reconstructs how this view results from Hegel’s criticism of Hume and Kant, but also shows how Hegel’s three-part division of social freedom is based on this mediation. Therefore, Honneth wrongly thinks that his three forms of social freedom (related to love, respect and solidarity) correspond to Hegel’s three-part division.
Freedom as Overcoming the Fear of Death
In The Paradigm of Recognition. Freedom as Overcoming the Fear of Death Paul Cobben defends the position that Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit contains all the building blocks to elaborate a paradigm of recognition which fundamentally criticizes the contemporary versions of Habermas, Rawls and Honneth. In his concept of recognition, the fear of death is the central category to understand the mediation between freedom and nature. Cobben not only systematically reconstructs how this view results from Hegel’s criticism of Hume and Kant, but also shows how Hegel’s three-part division of social freedom is based on this mediation. Therefore, Honneth wrongly thinks that his three forms of social freedom (related to love, respect and solidarity) correspond to Hegel’s three-part division.
The Legacy of German Idealism
Editor:
The theme of “Institutions of Education: then and today” not only corresponds with the basic questions raised in German Idealism, but is also central to the question of whether it is legitimate to study German Idealism in our era. Elaborating on this project immediately raises the problem of institutional differentiation, which characterizes multicultural society. Does the variety of educational institutions not, by definition, exclude the shared conception and realization of adulthood that is presupposed by German Idealism? This book shows that German Idealism can still participate in the contemporary debate on education: it is not only helpful in raising relevant questions, but can also be transformed into positions which can deal with the pluriformity that characterizes contemporary society.
The Legacy of German Idealism
Editor:
The theme of “Institutions of Education: then and today” not only corresponds with the basic questions raised in German Idealism, but is also central to the question of whether it is legitimate to study German Idealism in our era. Elaborating on this project immediately raises the problem of institutional differentiation, which characterizes multicultural society. Does the variety of educational institutions not, by definition, exclude the shared conception and realization of adulthood that is presupposed by German Idealism? This book shows that German Idealism can still participate in the contemporary debate on education: it is not only helpful in raising relevant questions, but can also be transformed into positions which can deal with the pluriformity that characterizes contemporary society.