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- Author or Editor: Philip Blosser x
Two problems in Scheler’s thought are (1) his reason/feeling dualism, which artificially limits his classification of values, undermining the coherence of experience and its rational intelligibility; and (2) his restriction of moral value to a by-product of realizing non-moral values, which leads him to misidentify the value attaching to personal agency exclusively with moral value. To resolve these problems, I enlist Herman Dooyeweerd’s analysis of experiential aspects, analogical concepts, and subject-object relations, which illumine both Scheler’s insights and his oversights.
The legacy of Herman Dooyeweerd, that colossus of reformational thinking, presents us not only with the gifts of his systematic genius, but also with the riddles of his unperfected work, which now have become a part of our own unfinished work. Not the least of these riddles and not the least of our unfinished work confront us in the legacy of Dooyeweerd’s anthropological reflections. As he indicates in the conclusion of his monumental New Critique, all of his previous investigations are nothing but preliminaries that implicitly converge upon the ultimate problems of philosophical anthropology. The question of man, in effect, constitutes the fundamental implicit theme of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy.
I begin by summarizing Stoker’s study of conscience in Das Gewissen. Then I contrast the initial acclaim it received from well-known phenomenologists with its subsequent undeserved neglect. One reason for the neglect, I surmise, is the waning of general interest in phenomenological approaches. Other reasons include Stoker’s relative isolation in South Africa, declining interest in Christian approaches to philosophy, and Calvinist concerns about the influence of Bavinck’s scholasticism and Scheler’s phenomenological method on Stoker. I argue that none of these reasons justifies the present neglect of Stoker’s magisterial work and its seminal insights.