The final clause of Hab 2:2 which originally may have referred to the confident proclamation of the message by those who read it was rendered in the LXX and Vulgate in ways which to interpreters in antiquity suggested quick understanding. But the Vulgate could also be read as a reference to being able to scan the text quickly or easily and this has become a prominent understanding of the clause. It is found in many modern translations across a variety of languages. Luther imagined a scenario in which the text was written in such large letters that even someone running past could read it. This novel understanding has persisted in some corners and is reflected in a number of translations. It is an indefensible variant of the view that the text refers to fluent reading, a view which is itself questionable but possible.
In the past few years, the philosophical debate about self-knowledge has presented itself in a strikingly ‘pre-Kantian’ fashion. Some claimed that all sorts of self-knowledge can be analyzed in the manner of the empiricists, or in terms of cognitive psychology (to use a more contemporary label), whereas defenders of rationalism have not grown tired of voicing the claim that there must be some sort of self-knowledge present and underlying, as it were, all sorts of epistemic self-concern. It is against this background that this paper advocates what I would call a ‘Kantian’ strategy to approach the problem of self-knowledge. Taking Kant as a model, it argues, we may come to see how the current divide between empiricism and rationalism may be overcome in philosophical theorizing about self-knowledge.
Edited by Brönniman and Renz
This publication has also been published in hardback, please click here for details.