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Abstract
In this paper I shall discuss the relationship between the two known Arabic translations of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics and Avicenna's Kitāb al-Burhān. I shall argue that Avicenna relies on both (1) Abū Bishr Mattā's translation and (2) the anonymous translation used by Averroes in the Long Commentary as well as in the Middle Commentary (and also indirectly preserved by Gerard of Cremona's Latin translation of Aristotle's work). Although, generally speaking, the problem is relevant to the history of the transmission of the Posterior Analytics from Greek through Syriac into Arabic, I do not intend to give a systematic presentation of the historical setting in which Aristotle's work became readily available to the Arabo-Islamic culture. My aim here is rather to isolate and discuss some pieces of evidence concerning the texts that seem to have been available to Avicenna.In addition to that, I shall also provide evidence concerning the relationship with the Greek commentary tradition (in particular Philoponus and Themistius) that is likely to have influenced Avicenna in his discussion of Aristotle's theory of demonstration and scientific knowledge.
Avicenna’s (d. 1037) theory of demonstration is largely inspired by Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics but also, at the same time, characterized by significant flashes of originality. One of the areas where Avicenna’s innovative contribution is most evident is his interpretation of the notion of necessity in the context of demonstrative arguments. The paper investigates two issues. First, the relationship between the notion of substantial necessity and that of descriptional necessity and their relevance for Avicenna’s theory of scientific discourse. Second, the question whether Barbara LXL qualifies as a genuine demonstrative argument, i.e., whether its combination of modalized premises provides sufficiently strong epistemic grounds for certitude to come about in the conclusion of a syllogism.
The notion of per se (kath’hautó) is a signature component of Aristotle’s theory of science. This paper has two aims: (i) to examine for the first time Avicenna’s (d. 1037) account of per se (ḏātī) in the context of his theory of demonstration, especially in the Kitāb al-Burhān, and more generally in what I shall call the Posterior Analytics complex, i.e., a larger set of relevant texts from Avicenna’s logical works that deal with An. Post., and (ii) to connect it with his theory of predicables as formulated in the Kitāb al-Madḫal, and more generally in what I shall call, by analogy, the Isagoge complex.
In the Posterior Analytics complex, Avicenna reasserts the role of per se predication and articulates an innovative and systematic interpretation (showing a debt towards Fārābī and the Greek commentary tradition) of the notions of per se 1 and per se 2 originally developed by Aristotle in An. Post. A4 around the idea of a term being taken in the definition of another term. In the Isagoge complex, Avicenna understands per se 1 and 2 in terms of two types of entailment of different strength—containment (taḍammun) and implication (iltizām)—, which are in turn associated with the technical notions of inseparability in conception (taṣawwur) and in imagination (tawahhum). As a result, the distinction between per se 1 and 2 in Avicenna turns out to be philosophically grounded in a larger theoretical framework than it is in Aristotle.
In addition to its intrinsic interest, Avicenna’s solution also counts as an interpretive effort that aims to solve some traditional exegetical problems in Aristotle, e.g., the question whether the class of per se 2 predicates from An. Post. A4 and that of per se accidents coincide, an issue that has vexed commentators since antiquity.
Abstract
In this paper I will examine the relation between the theory of obligations and its use in sophismatic contexts through the lens of certain pragmatic concerns. In order to do this, I will take a sophism discussed by Peter of Mantua in his treatise on obligations as a case-study. I will first provide a brief outline of the structure of the treatise and then examine a concrete case that shows how the relationship between background assumptions (casus and context of utterance) and criteria of response seems to suggest a way to qualify the application of general rules (especially for irrelevant sentences) in certain limit-cases. By discussing Peter’s presentation of the sophism, I will also argue for a connection between Peter of Mantua’s text and Mesino de Codronchi’s Questiones on the De Interpretatione.