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Abstract
In Homo Juridicus, Alain Supiot argues that law has an 'anthropological' function – constituting people as rational beings by linking together their biological and symbolic dimensions. The law also serves a 'dogmatic function', embodying Western values and serving as a bar to totalitarian scientism and tempering the excesses of technology in the workplace. However, the anthropological function of the law has been undermined by the advance of science and economics and widespread privatisation, contractualisation and deregulation. This article contests Supiot's claims, especially as regards Marxism, counterposing his position to that of Bolshevik legal theorist Evgeny Pashukanis. Pashukanis's insights into the relationship between law and capitalism are used to re-frame Supiot's argument and to undermine his contention that globalisation is inimical to law. Pashukanis is also invoked to contest the claims that the anthropological function of the law is the only alternative to totalitarianism and that law serves to 'humanise' technology.
Abstract
Bill Bowring’s book attempts to argue for a Marxist account of international law that embraces it as a tool for progressive politics and revolutionary change. He argues it is necessary to give a substantive account of both, locating them in the real struggles of the oppressed. Specifically, he locates human rights in the three great revolutions ‐ the French, the Russian and the anticolonial. However, this revolutionary heritage has been ‘degraded’ by recent events. As such, it is necessary to adopt ‘revolutionary conservatism’, invoking international law’s origins against its current degradation. This review argues that, owing to international law’s indeterminacy, Bowring’s project is susceptible to imperial appropriation. This means, however, that Bowring cannot give an account of why we should use international law. It then argues that Bowring’s account of Pashukanis is wrong, and that Pashukanis’s work can better make sense of Bowring’s insights and international law more generally.
A neglected episode in West Malaysia’s subaltern history illustrates how simplistic Western notions of peace—and consequently, of surrender and resistance—can be. In the case of Semai in the Semai heartland, what seems like submission to external pressures turns out to be an ambiguous and ambivalent way of keeping the peace between Malays and Semai in the guise of adding new tools to traditional Semai internal peacekeeping praxis. Semai “double consciousness” of both their own reality and how Malays conceive of it thus allows them to avoid the imposition of external authority by creating a simulacrum thereof. “Surrender” and resistance overlap.
