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Abstract
In Homo Juridicus, Alain Supiot argues that law has an 'anthropological' function – constituting people as rational beings by linking together their biological and symbolic dimensions. The law also serves a 'dogmatic function', embodying Western values and serving as a bar to totalitarian scientism and tempering the excesses of technology in the workplace. However, the anthropological function of the law has been undermined by the advance of science and economics and widespread privatisation, contractualisation and deregulation. This article contests Supiot's claims, especially as regards Marxism, counterposing his position to that of Bolshevik legal theorist Evgeny Pashukanis. Pashukanis's insights into the relationship between law and capitalism are used to re-frame Supiot's argument and to undermine his contention that globalisation is inimical to law. Pashukanis is also invoked to contest the claims that the anthropological function of the law is the only alternative to totalitarianism and that law serves to 'humanise' technology.
Abstract
Despite minimal prospects of success, international lawyers spent the first few months of the global pandemic discussing whether the rules of state responsibility could be invoked against states, especially China, for their acts and omissions regarding COVID-19. In this piece, we take these debates seriously, if not necessarily literally. We argue that the unrealistic nature of these debates does not make them irrelevant. Rather, we propose an ideology critique of state responsibility as a legal field. Our approach is two-fold. First, we argue these debates need to be situated within the rise of geopolitical competition between the US and its allies on the one hand and China on the other. In this context, state responsibility is always laid at the feet of one’s opponents. Secondly, we posit that my emphasising the role of states, recourse to state responsibility renders invisible the role of transnational processes of capitalist production and exchange that have profound effects on nature and set the stage for the emergence and spread of infectious diseases. Drawing from the work of the geographer Neil Smith, we argue against the ‘naturalisation’ of disasters performed much of the international legal discourse about COVID-19.
Abstract
The question of capitalism’s relationship to issues of race, racism and processes of racialisation has become increasingly prominent in contemporary debates. This special issue of Historical Materialism on ‘Race and Capital’ seeks to intervene in these debates. In this Introduction, we situate the special issue within this wider political, historical and theoretical context. We begin by reconstructing some of the key tensions and fault lines within contemporary discussions of race and racism, particularly in relation to the Marxist tradition. Against those who claim a primarily oppositional relationship between the Marxist tradition and anti-racist thinking, we chart a historical account of key moments in which Marxist movements and thinkers have attempted to articulate distinctively historical-materialist accounts of race and racism. We then situate the key themes of the special issue – and the various articles that compose the issue – against this background.
Abstract
Bill Bowring’s book attempts to argue for a Marxist account of international law that embraces it as a tool for progressive politics and revolutionary change. He argues it is necessary to give a substantive account of both, locating them in the real struggles of the oppressed. Specifically, he locates human rights in the three great revolutions ‐ the French, the Russian and the anticolonial. However, this revolutionary heritage has been ‘degraded’ by recent events. As such, it is necessary to adopt ‘revolutionary conservatism’, invoking international law’s origins against its current degradation. This review argues that, owing to international law’s indeterminacy, Bowring’s project is susceptible to imperial appropriation. This means, however, that Bowring cannot give an account of why we should use international law. It then argues that Bowring’s account of Pashukanis is wrong, and that Pashukanis’s work can better make sense of Bowring’s insights and international law more generally.
A neglected episode in West Malaysia’s subaltern history illustrates how simplistic Western notions of peace—and consequently, of surrender and resistance—can be. In the case of Semai in the Semai heartland, what seems like submission to external pressures turns out to be an ambiguous and ambivalent way of keeping the peace between Malays and Semai in the guise of adding new tools to traditional Semai internal peacekeeping praxis. Semai “double consciousness” of both their own reality and how Malays conceive of it thus allows them to avoid the imposition of external authority by creating a simulacrum thereof. “Surrender” and resistance overlap.