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Shandong Province and Chinese Communist Military and Financial Strength, 1937-1945
Series:
China Studies, Volume: 19
Author:
Did the Chinese Communists use money or banking systems during their struggle for national power? In the West, this question was not answered, or even raised, for sixty years after the Communists took over China in 1949. This book examines the Communists’ revenue and supply system during the Japanese occupation in Shandong, a coastal province in northern China. It explores how the Communists manipulated currency exchange rates to turn trade within the occupied zones into their principal source of revenue and transform the Japanese army and navy into their most important customers. Thus enabling them to stockpile the materials needed for the race against the Nationalists into Manchuria, China’s only industrialized area, immediately after Japan’s surrender.
Shandong Province and Chinese Communist Military and Financial Strength, 1937-1945
Series:
China Studies, Volume: 19
Author:
Did the Chinese Communists use money or banking systems during their struggle for national power? In the West, this question was not answered, or even raised, for sixty years after the Communists took over China in 1949. This book examines the Communists’ revenue and supply system during the Japanese occupation in Shandong, a coastal province in northern China. It explores how the Communists manipulated currency exchange rates to turn trade within the occupied zones into their principal source of revenue and transform the Japanese army and navy into their most important customers. Thus enabling them to stockpile the materials needed for the race against the Nationalists into Manchuria, China’s only industrialized area, immediately after Japan’s surrender.
Author:
Abstract
The New Fourth Army (N4A) Incident is the name given to the destruction by the Chinese Nationalist government of the headquarters of the N4A, one of the two legal armies under the command of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the Sino-Japanese War, in southern Anhui province in January 1941, together with the killing of about nine thousand CCP soldiers. It was the largest and the last armed conflict between the Nationalists and the CCP during the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). This article argues that this tragedy came from Joseph Stalin’s paranoia toward the West and Mao’s resulting limited pre-emptive offensives against the Nationalist government, as well as their misreading of Chiang Kai-shek during 1939-1940.