A consensus is still to be reached regarding the relationship between trade, growth, and the environment in either the existing theoretical models or previous empirical analyses. By using a Sino-Korean case study, we expect this work to contribute to the theoretical and empirical knowledge of the relationship between trade, growth and the environment. In this paper, four types of simulation are executed by applying a Sino-Korea CGE model. The results reveal that an increasing volume of bilateral trade boosts the real GDP at a decreasing rate. Different degrees in the volume of increase of bilateral trade produce welfare gains for Chinese households, i.e. more household spending. Welfare increases at a decreasing rate when the degree of bilateral trade growth increases less stringently, while in Korea there are welfare losses (less household consumption) when the bilateral trade target becomes increasingly stringent. Moreover, the investment gains in the economy tend to rise more sharply as the degree of bilateral trade growth increases less stringently in China. The investment tends to decrease at a proportional rate when the target bilateral trade volume becomes more stringent and the changes in the gross investment become more significant in Korea. In addition, the aggregate production shows a tendency to increase at a proportional rate with a more stringent target bilateral trade volume and when there are considerable changes in gross production. Furthermore, the impact of most production sectors can benefit China, but have a negative impact on Korea. Meantime, the simulations highlight that import growth increases carbon emissions at a decreasing rate, and export growth increases carbon emissions. According to our policy findings, policy makers should be advised to consider the third trade policy (Scenario c), which maintains a reasonable economic growth but at the expense of investment and welfare.
China’s policymakers regard forest carbon sequestration as one of the most cost-effective ways to combat climate change. Yet, scholars argue that foreign forest carbon projects in developing countries are environmentally and socially unsustainable. This paper explores China’s policy and legal framework for the sustainability of forest carbon projects that utilize international carbon-certification schemes. It finds that while China’s government has set ambitious climate goals for the forest sector, the applicable regulations are not comprehensively developed, and risks of unsustainability exist in practice. The government should undertake comprehensive institutional reform, including reform to establish implementation regulations for redd projects, adjust laws on forest and land to address climate risks, set up regulatory social-impact assessments, and create a greater demand for private forest sustainability assessments.
This article focuses on how Chinese foundations distribute funds, i.e. the ways in which they spend their money and how these ways are changing. By reviewing the practices of numerous domestic foundations, this paper identifies two methods of distribution. These methods, referred to as the “closed way” and the “open way,” are differentiated by the fields in which funding recipient institutions work and by the ways in which foundations select funding recipients. The “closed way” tends to be monopolized, mandated top-down, bureaucratic, low-cost, and tends to involve small disbursements. While its simplicity and speed help reduce administrative costs, thereby better leveraging resources, the “closed way” may also corrode foundations’ independence and blur the boundary between governments and foundations. The “open way” tends to be open, transparent, competitive, and selective. This method of distribution facilitates the entry of donations into the civil society sector, and puts resources to work in society. A party to civil organizations’ broad progress over the last 30 years, foundations in China are shifting their methods of distribution from “closed” to “open,” a change we see expressed both in the growth of foundations’ operating partners and in the increasing use of competitive mechanisms. Taking the “open way” will increase foundations’ role in supporting the third sector and help foundations become engines of civil society in China.
We are mainly concerned with the decision-making problem with fuzzy preference relation. The key of this issue is how to derive the priority vector of fuzzy preference relation. In this paper, we establish two linear programming models. By solving the model, we can get the priority vector of fuzzy preference relation. The effectiveness and practicality of the developed two models are illustrated with a numerical example.
This article examines the life and poetry of Wang Wei, one of the most distinguished courtesan poets of the Ming dynasty. Through an examination of her courtesan career, her friendship networks in literati circles, and her adoption of multiple identities such as xianren (person of leisure), daoren (person of the Dao), and shiren (poet), it seeks to illustrate what I believe is an important explanation for the flourishing of late Ming courtesan and literati culture. The rising prominence of learned and literary courtesans was strongly connected to a new social formation of nonconformist literati, the “men of the mountains” (shanren). These nonofficial urban elites of the prosperous Jiangnan region fashioned themselves as retired literati, devoting themselves to art, recreation, and self-invention, instead of government service. In constructing an “artistic and hedonistic counterculture,” they encouraged the involvement of both courtesans and literary women of the gentry class.
Under the guidance of the Central Document No. 11 and concerted efforts from various forces, great progress and breakthroughs were made in China’s farmer organization in 2015: First, new explorations were made by supply and marketing cooperatives in the mode of serving agriculture; second, expert and scholarly teams participated in pilot comprehensive reform of grassroots supply and marketing cooperatives; third, with the government playing the leading role, a system for farmers’ cooperative economic organization was built with the province as the unit; fourth, farmers’ specialized cooperatives started actively engaging with supply and marketing cooperatives. However, some problems still existed, to which attention must be paid.