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of the same process. The question then is what motivates Heraclitus to say ‘A lives the death of B and B dies the life of A’ instead of just ‘A lives the death of B’. 3.2 An Active/Active Model of Change The previous investigation suggests that the terms (i) life/living and death/dying are

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
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procedure whose originary sense may always be “reactivated” with self-evidence (Crisis , 46, 359). As we have seen, Husserl characterizes the structure of a broad range of con- scious life through his concept of motivation. Motivating contents press on us to varying degrees toward that which they motivate

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
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can now analyze the hedonist's stance towards life A and life B. 3.1.2 The Case 0/ the Amount Hedonist At first glance, question and answer seem to be trivial and obvious, respec- tively. The amount hedonist would, of course, prefer living life B over living life A for the obvious reason that a

In: Radical Life Extension
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broad range of eon- seious life through his coneept of motivation. Motivating contents press on us to varying degrees toward that wbieh they motivate, binding analytically distinct mental acts into experiential wholes in virtue of a felt-belongingness. The motiva- tion relation itself does not

In: The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl

though this points towards a very important aspect, the badness of death cannot be explained solely via the desire to continue living. For one thing, one does not always have to explicitly express a desire for x for x to be in one’s interest and, accordingly, to be harmed by x’s non-occurrence. In

In: Planning for the Future
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us with good reasons to exercise our right to end our lives at will. Quite the contrary, by assuming that in end-of-life situations it is sometimes more dignified to commit suicide than to continue living, we express a morally dubious attitude of contempt to other people. In short, although we have a

In: Theorie und Praxis der Menschenwürde
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for its eventual deterioration, but also a reason for the very need to absorb new matter and get rid of old matter. And this, after all, is what life is about. That is, if the constituents of their bodies would never reassert themselves, living beings would probably be radically different, if they

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis

DIE? Is it a bad thing to die? H life has lost its meaning, is unbearable, or has somehow been brought to an end, death is not a threat. Death is not a threat to the living person who has lost interest in living. For the person thinking that our task in life is to let go of our ego and instead

In: Kant: Here, Now and How

, attitudes and needs of the related living beings whose organic bodies and their relations comprise that same place when conceived as spatially extended. The beach is not just a place of mere material objects; it is also a place of lifea place where the birds perceive, the constitutive parts of each grain

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
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6 Results and Recommendations After having discussed a wide variety of arguments for and against life ex- tension in the previous chapters, the time has co me to state the results of this discussion. As one should note, some arguments can count as sound almost without question (Group A) whereas

In: Radical Life Extension