A Psychological Study
, the discontinuity between a group and its members’ intentional states vanishes. If this is right, it seems that a group epistemic agency could be entirely explained in terms of mutually related individuals’ beliefs, hence the thesis of a group as a self-standing agent is seriously undermined. Yet, in
mutually related individuals’ beliefs, hence the thesis of a group as a self-standing agent is seriously undermined. Yet, in the last part of the paper I will show that this pessimistic conclusion is not inevitable. The group agency
Edited by Jozef Corveleyn and Dirk Hutsebaut
Whereas the belief-desire model maintains that reasons for action either are or depend on reasons which consist in the agent's own beliefs and desires, I contend that reasons for action, whether taken normatively (as reasons to do something) or explanatorily, (as reasons for which agents act) are states of affairs. I defend this view by reference to non-deliberative responses to states of affairs agents encounter directly – stopping for a stop sign or answering a knock at the door, for instance–actions which I take to be common, to presuppose no specific attitudes on the part of agents, and to be basic to all action.
Stefanie Schnitzer Mills
Introduction The concept of Evil is something that rings familiar with virtually every culture across time and space. It seems to be a belief that is shared with some of our earliest ancestors – the idea of something so far removed from what we perceive as right and acceptable that simple terms
From Normative Rules to Heuristics
Edited by Marek Hetmański
Contributors include María José Frápolli, Marek Hetmański, Jan F. Jacko, Artur Koterski, Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik, Sofia Miguens, Ángeles J. Perona, Manueal de Pinedo, João Alberto Pinto, Krzysztof Polit, Marcin Rządeczka, Rui Sampaio da Silva, Joanna Sokołowska, Barbara Trybulec, Marcin Trybulec, Neftalí Villanueva, Monika Walczak, Jan Winkowski, Anna Wójtowicz, Jesús Zamora-Bonilla, and António Zilhão.
Garrett P.J. Epp
While the Wycliffite Tretise of Miraclis Pleyinge famously condemns religious theatre as sinful idleness and ‘signs without deed,’ biblical drama has the potential to be highly productive, as a form of performative theology. Much like the meditative mode of affective piety, likewise common in the later Middle Ages, when undertaken seriously by or for those who believe in what it represents, the performance of biblical drama can create rather than merely represent theological meaning. This paper examines a variety of texts and performances, medieval and modern, in order to demonstrate how religious belief and theatrical make-believe can intertwine.
In order to know what a belief is, we need to know when it is appropriate to say that two subjects (or the same subject at two different times) believe(s) the same or entertain the same thought. This is not entirely straightforward. Consider for instance
1. Tom thinks that he himself is the smartest and Tim believes the same
2. In 2001, Bill believed that some action had to be taken to save the rain forest and today he believes the same.
What does Tim think? That he, Tim, is the smartest, or that Tom is? And what does Bill believe today? That action had to be taken in 2001 or that it has to be taken now? Both answers are intuitively acceptable. This has to be accounted for somehow.
Building on Mark Richard's work on tense, Scott Soames 1 claims that the substitutional interpretation of the quantifiers is unable to account for the intended meaning of such statements as (2) and the validity of some inferences involving them. I will show that his argument is not convincing. Not only does the substitutional interpretation fare no worse than the objectual one, but it seems to be able to avoid a problem which could be seriously damaging for any account of the sameness of thoughts based on the notion of structured proposition. In the first section, I state the problem allegedly raised by tensed belief ascriptions to the substitutional interpretation of the quantifiers. In the second, Soames's argument is shown to be flawed. I also show that the content of the that-clause in (2) is not faithfully represented by any kind of structured proposition. Finally, I show how the substitutional interpretation can handle all such statements as (1) and (2) and the inferences involving them.