Offshore oil and gas fields are important petrochemical energy bases in China. In 2018, China’s domestic crude oil output was approximately 192 million tons, and offshore oil and gas production was 64.6 million tons of crude oil equivalent, accounting for about one-third of the
protection of the sedentary species are especially important in the seas where regional fisheries management organisations ( RFMO s) are yet to be created, for example, in the South China Sea, the Caribbean region, or West Africa. The Arctic Ocean is a special case: while there is no RFMO in the region
’ (2012) 27 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 805–812, at p. 811.
Nordquist et al. (n 12), p. 40.
See also the South China Sea Arbitration ( The Republic of Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China ), Award, 12 July 2016, Permanent Court of Arbitration
NV (2009/05/27) and Denmark NV (2009/05/27); 60 Submission No. 24 by Fiji, opposed by Vanuatu NV (2009/08/12); 61 Submission No. 41 by Palau, opposed by Philippines NV (2009/08/04); 62 Submission No. 48 by India, partly delayed by Bangladesh NV (2009/10/29); 63 Submission No. 63 by China
Keyuan Zou (ed.), The Belt and Road Initiative and the Law of the Sea (Leiden, Brill Nijhoff), 2020, ISBN : 9789004422049, hardbound, €121, 220 pp.
China’s ambitious re-development of the Maritime and Economic Silk Road and Route for global trade, energy and infrastructure interconnectivity
unified Korea map displayed on the conference chairs and on a dessert at the summit lunch, followed in June with the conduct of ROK naval exercises around the islands. 3
Dokdo/Takeshima became a part of regional security dynamics in July 2019 when Russia and China conducted a joint air patrol, their
are both mature democracies in East Asia whose economies are interdependent. On the international security front, they are both treaty allies of the United States and can potentially gain much by enhancing security cooperation over China’s rise and North Korea’s nuclear weapons program in the region
. Specifically, the provincial assembly members argued that Chinese documents and even Japanese history books described Daema as part of Korea’s territory until the mid-19th century. Although the resolution was not passed in the end, the incident displeased the Japanese.
Lawmakers in the opposition parties in
derive from the coastal state’s sovereignty over land). 41 This rule is also not applicable to Liancourt Rocks as they are well above water at high tide.
The award of the arbitral panel In the matter of the South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v. China) 42 set out the following factors for
While much attention has been directed at maritime and territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas, another important decades-long unresolved dispute exists over a set of islands Koreans call Dokdo and the Japanese, Takeshima. The islands consist of two main islets
the literal wording of the 1905 Cabinet Decision except for an unreadable photographic reproduction of the original paper written in classic Chinese characters and with no reference to the Dajokan Directive of 1877 (10th Year of Meiji), either.
Japan’s Historical Argument and Justifications
establish a foothold with China’s encouragement in the Joseon regime. 31 Eventually, China and Japan faced off in Korea. Japanese military forces secured a decisive victory over China after which Korea declared its independence from China, but from 1895 onwards, Korea found itself directly confronting
manned lighthouse on Takeshima in December 1998.
During the talks for a new fisheries pact, Seoul did not regard Dokdo (Takeshima) as a base point for its EEZ in the Sea of Japan, whereas Tokyo did. Seoul did so to reject Tokyo’s position that Hizen-torishima, small Japanese islets in the East China
, President Bush chose the third option as the best way to resolve the dilemma quickly and remove an obstacle to a successful trip to South Korea. Bush reasoned he had too many crucial issues on the agenda for his visit to be upended by this concern. 42 In a meeting with reporters from South Korea, China
energy resources and adjustments in fishing rights around Dokdo/Takeshima. In addition, Japan might conceivably press South Korea to be more supportive of the Japanese position on its other territorial disputes with Russia and China but we don’t see any past evidence of Japan attempting this and
-Leste protested Indonesia’s claim on Feb. 6, 2012.
e French protest re Mauritius claim to Tromelin 30 July 2009; UK protest re Mauritius claim to BIOT March 19, 2009.
f China protest re Philippine claims to Nansha Islands/Kalayaan Group and Huanghan Island/Bajo de Masinloc April 13, 2009.
g French protest
14 of the LOS Convention, China appears not to permit the use of the normal baseline as its baseline. Article 3 of the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Feb. 25, 1992, provides that the baseline “is designated with the method of straight baselines, formed by joining the various
Cumulative Digest 1753, 1864 (also protested by the United Kingdom in 1993); China , regarding article 13 of the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of Feb. 25, 1992 (which may be found in UN, LOS Bull ., No. 21 (1992), at 26), by oral demarche delivered Aug. 26, 1992, in Beijing, and
In its award In the matter of the South China Sea Arbitration ( Philippines v. China ), the Tribunal found that China had breached its resource conservation obligations under articles 192, 194(1), 194(5) and 206 of the LOS Convention. 100
UN Efforts at Conservation and
their presence does not affect the delimitation of the territorial sea, EEZ or continental shelf. In the South China Sea Arbitration award, the Tribunal implied that the construction of an artificial island, installation or structure on a low-tide elevation does not entitle the artificial island to
More nations should copy the US practice of conducting freedom of navigation activities in relation to illegal claims. 23
Such steps are still important when a number of countries, particularly China, have continued to insist on seeking to restrict the activities of foreign warships and military
. Further the report on this agreement states “[t]here is some uncertainty respecting the status of the” agreement, noting that “there have been fundamental government changes in Cambodia since the Heng Samrin government entered into the agreement.” 23
China – South China Sea
China has not
Convention. 18 In addition, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cape Verde, China, India, Iran, Malaysia, Maldives, Pakistan, Thailand and Uruguay do not permit foreign military exercises in their EEZ s. Colombia has claimed that foreign States do not have the right to conduct maritime counter-narcotics law enforcement
territorial sea of another State without prior consent of the latter”); 46 Benin (“there was no such thing as innocent passage of warships”); 47 China (“the right of the coastal State to require prior authorization or notification for the passage of foreign warships through the territorial sea in
set out any criteria for judging which high-tide features were rocks under article 121(3). The Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration ( Philippines v. China ) gave its (first-time) view as to the distinguishing characteristics of high-tide features in the context of the Spratly Islands. 21
which are not consistent with the convention. There is a proliferation of excessive claims by coastal states. In my view, such claims should be challenged and, if possible, the courts or arbitral tribunals should be asked to rule on them. 13
These views were reflected in a 2016 declaration by China
20 States have exercised this right under article 298(1)(b): Algeria, Argentina, Belarus, Cabo Verde, Canada, Chile, China, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Greece, Mexico, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Tunisia, United Kingdom and Uruguay. 115 Upon accession, the United States
.), Recent Development in the Law of the Sea Issues and China 351–424 (Leiden: Nijhoff, 2005), and id ., PSI and SUA: An Update, in Nordquist, Wolfrum, Moore and Long , ( eds .), Legal Challenges in Maritime Security 281–325 (Leiden: Nijhoff, 2008).
See the list as at March 19, 2019 at
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ( LOS Convention).
USNS Bowditch ’s mission during this time period was to collect military survey data off the coasts of various states in the East and South China Seas for military purposes. The purpose of these military surveys is to support
clarifies any concerns regarding the operation of US military and other state aircraft in international airspace that falls within the Maiquetia FIR . 20
Air Defense Identification Zones ( ADIZ )
Effective 10:00 AM , November 23, 2013, China declared an ADIZ covering much of the