-Leste protested Indonesia’s claim on Feb. 6, 2012.
e French protest re Mauritius claim to Tromelin 30 July 2009; UK protest re Mauritius claim to BIOT March 19, 2009.
f China protest re Philippine claims to Nansha Islands/Kalayaan Group and Huanghan Island/Bajo de Masinloc April 13, 2009.
g French protest
14 of the LOS Convention, China appears not to permit the use of the normal baseline as its baseline. Article 3 of the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Feb. 25, 1992, provides that the baseline “is designated with the method of straight baselines, formed by joining the various
Cumulative Digest 1753, 1864 (also protested by the United Kingdom in 1993); China , regarding article 13 of the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of Feb. 25, 1992 (which may be found in UN, LOS Bull ., No. 21 (1992), at 26), by oral demarche delivered Aug. 26, 1992, in Beijing, and
In its award In the matter of the South China Sea Arbitration ( Philippines v. China ), the Tribunal found that China had breached its resource conservation obligations under articles 192, 194(1), 194(5) and 206 of the LOS Convention. 100
UN Efforts at Conservation and
their presence does not affect the delimitation of the territorial sea, EEZ or continental shelf. In the South China Sea Arbitration award, the Tribunal implied that the construction of an artificial island, installation or structure on a low-tide elevation does not entitle the artificial island to
More nations should copy the US practice of conducting freedom of navigation activities in relation to illegal claims. 23
Such steps are still important when a number of countries, particularly China, have continued to insist on seeking to restrict the activities of foreign warships and military
. Further the report on this agreement states “[t]here is some uncertainty respecting the status of the” agreement, noting that “there have been fundamental government changes in Cambodia since the Heng Samrin government entered into the agreement.” 23
China – South China Sea
China has not
Convention. 18 In addition, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cape Verde, China, India, Iran, Malaysia, Maldives, Pakistan, Thailand and Uruguay do not permit foreign military exercises in their EEZ s. Colombia has claimed that foreign States do not have the right to conduct maritime counter-narcotics law enforcement
territorial sea of another State without prior consent of the latter”); 46 Benin (“there was no such thing as innocent passage of warships”); 47 China (“the right of the coastal State to require prior authorization or notification for the passage of foreign warships through the territorial sea in
set out any criteria for judging which high-tide features were rocks under article 121(3). The Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration ( Philippines v. China ) gave its (first-time) view as to the distinguishing characteristics of high-tide features in the context of the Spratly Islands. 21
which are not consistent with the convention. There is a proliferation of excessive claims by coastal states. In my view, such claims should be challenged and, if possible, the courts or arbitral tribunals should be asked to rule on them. 13
These views were reflected in a 2016 declaration by China
20 States have exercised this right under article 298(1)(b): Algeria, Argentina, Belarus, Cabo Verde, Canada, Chile, China, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Greece, Mexico, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Tunisia, United Kingdom and Uruguay. 115 Upon accession, the United States
.), Recent Development in the Law of the Sea Issues and China 351–424 (Leiden: Nijhoff, 2005), and id ., PSI and SUA: An Update, in Nordquist, Wolfrum, Moore and Long , ( eds .), Legal Challenges in Maritime Security 281–325 (Leiden: Nijhoff, 2008).
See the list as at March 19, 2019 at
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ( LOS Convention).
USNS Bowditch ’s mission during this time period was to collect military survey data off the coasts of various states in the East and South China Seas for military purposes. The purpose of these military surveys is to support
clarifies any concerns regarding the operation of US military and other state aircraft in international airspace that falls within the Maiquetia FIR . 20
Air Defense Identification Zones ( ADIZ )
Effective 10:00 AM , November 23, 2013, China declared an ADIZ covering much of the
governments in the operation of the Council. There are twelve observer states (France, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, UK, and six admitted in 2013: China, India, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Singapore) and a number of non-governmental observers. The EC is seeking observer status. 41 In
a British submarine in 1944, remains the property of the German State); Dromgoole and Gaskell, supra n. 34, at 234–235.
29 Japanese Ann. Int’l L. 115 (1986) (objects located on Chinese territorial seabed recovered from Japanese troopship Awa Maru sunk during World War II remained
(via the Andaman Sea) and the Pacific Ocean (via the South China Sea).
Strait of Malacca region
At the broad western entrance to the Strait of Malacca, the littoral coasts of Indonesia and Malaysia are separated by about 200 miles. The strait, however, begins to funnel in a
break occurs in disputed waters, permits may be required from each claimant, causing further delay, such as in the South China Sea.
Given that submarine cables are part of the world’s critical infrastructure, solutions to permitting problems are urgently required. 72
customary international law. See further Y. Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea (3rd ed.) 102–104 (Cambridge (UK), 2019). All high-tide features (islands and rocks) are entitled to maritime zones whether or not sovereignty is settled or disputed. The South China Sea arbitration determined which
difficulties. Taiwan (Province of China) is a major international fishing entity. Its high seas fishing capacity is extensive and likely to increase, especially in the Indian and South Pacific Oceans. However, due to political non-recognition, Taiwan (Province of China) does not participate fully in any
Perspective on the Preparatory Phase’ in M. Nordquist, J. N. Moore, R Long, Cooperation and Engagement in the South China Sea And Asia Pacific Region (Leiden/Boston: Brill/Nijhoff, 2019) 443–468; R Long and M Rodríguez‐Chaves, ‘Anatomy of a New International Instrument for Biodiversity beyond National
igc 3 para 12.4 (c).
93 See e.g., Earth News Bulletin 25.3.19 from igc 2 Caricom and psids want a sui generis approach to ip ; G77/ China, African Group, Iran, Tonga, Federated States of Micronesia, Turkey, png , Sri Lanka and Cuba want ip included in the ilbi ; Singapore want ip to be
supplemented by the common heritage of mankind principle put forward robustly by the G77 + China group as dispositive of the status of marine genetic resources beyond abnj .
This brings us to one of the most simplistic heuristics in the bbnj negotiations – that the common heritage of mankind ( chm ) and
article 121(3) that the term “rock” only applies to islands “which cannot sustain human habitation or an economic life of their own.” 39
The first international judicial interpretation of article 121(3) featured in the arbitral award in the 2016 case brought by the Philippines against China under the
and what it is not, Indonesia has wealth of experience on defining what is marine genetic resources in our vast waters stretching from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea to the Pacific Ocean. For us, under our laws, regulations and culture, marine genetic resources include all life forms at sea
, China, Japan, and South Korea and India are taking special interest in many aspects of the Arctic that focus on scientific research, shipping, and resource development. This chapter explores the growing interests of China, Japan, South Korea in the Arctic and examines the nature of their interests and
October 2018, the Arctic Five, the group of five Arctic littoral States (the United States, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Russia), along with five other states: China, Japan, South Korea, Iceland, and the EU, which control large, distant-water fishing fleets, agreed to a 16-year moratorium on commercial
in which China behaves in the South China Sea at present. This does not bode well for the future.
Another serious matter is the manner in which refugees that come across the Mediterranean are treated. We must also realise that climate change may in the future generate a flow of refugees in the
Distant-water fishing is a strategic industry in China on the grounds that it can guarantee the supply of domestic products, facilitate cooperation between Chinese and foreign fishery companies, and serve as an important component of the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative.” 1 Started in
The next article, entitled, ‘Strengthening the Legal Protection of Female Labourers in Marine Fisheries - A Chinese Perspective,’ by Ruiyao He and Yen-Chiang Chang of Dalian Maritime University in China, highlights the vulnerability and lack of effective legal protection of the
[of the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement].” 146
18.104.22.168 South China Sea Arbitration (Republic of Philippines v The People’s Republic of China)
In 2013, the Philippines instituted action against China and tasked the itlos Annex vii Arbitral Tribunal with determining the “legal basis of