the prediction objection , i.e., the objection that skeptical predictions conflict with the way we ordinarily speak and think about knowledge ( Bonjour 2010, DeRose 1995, Greco 2000, Grice 1989, Hawthorne 2004, Lewis 1996 , Schaffer 2004a ). Roughly put, the objection is that skepticism leads to
following dynamic link: https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.8982455 . We have seen in some of the early lectures the central role that prediction plays in event comprehension—in particular, in the segmentation of events. I have tried to show reasons to think that events are segmented because of spikes in
questions, we first need a clear understanding of the processing of ordinary, functional actions. From a cognitive perspective it has become apparent that prediction of a goal structure intertwined with causal expectations is extremely important to our perception and understanding of action sequences as
Respondents in Asian Cultures (e.g., Chinese) are More Risk-Seeking and More Overconfident than Respondents in Other Cultures (e.g., in United States) but the Reciprocal Predictions are in Total Opposition: How and Why? ∗ S HU L I ∗∗ and Y ONGQING F ANG ∗∗∗ ABSTRACT Triggered by rather
explanatory power. It will not gain in terms of predictive power because adding DRP does not put us in a position to make any predictions about the correct deontic verdicts for cases other than deontic-restriction scenarios. To illustrate what is meant by this, it bears comparing DRP with a principle like »It
mpi makes the wrong predictions in many cases; further pragmatic theses aside, the views are committed to a particularly implausible form of speaker error. Or so I will argue in sections 2–6, taking into account patterns of cross-contextual rejection of knowledge claims, of retraction (section 4
belief formation. The paper makes a strong improvement upon the existing extensions of reliabilism in this respect. That is to say, I characterise reliable processes in terms of prediction error minimisation cognitive mechanisms (as being revealed by the Prediction Error Minimisation theory [ pem for
This essay ties together some main strands of the author’s research spanning the last quarter-century. Because of its broad scope and space limitations, he prescinds from detailed arguments and instead intuitively motivates the general points which are supported more fully in other publications to which he provides references. After an initial delineation of several distinct notions of meaning (Section 1), the author considers (Section 2) such a notion deriving from the evolutionary biology of communication that he terms ‘organic meaning’, and places it in the context of evolutionary game theory. That provides a framework for a special type of organic meaning found in the phenomenon of expression (3), of which the author here offers an updated characterization while highlighting its wide philosophical interest. Expression in turn generalizes to a paradigmatic form of human communication—conversation—and section 4 provides a taxonomy of conversation-types while arguing that attention to such types helps to sharpen predictions of what speakers say rather than conversationally implicate. We close (5) with a view of fictional discourse on which authors of fictional works are engaged in conversation with their readers, and can provide them with knowledge in spite of the fictional character of their conversation. Such knowledge includes knowledge of how an emotion feels and is thus a route to empathy.