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can now analyze the hedonist's stance towards life A and life B. 3.1.2 The Case 0/ the Amount Hedonist At first glance, question and answer seem to be trivial and obvious, respec- tively. The amount hedonist would, of course, prefer living life B over living life A for the obvious reason that a
turn, the art of good living has engaged with aesthetics in seeking a stable foothold in the face of decomposition of codified ethical systems. All these tendencies are expressed in the pragmatist concept of action with experience framed as a certain point in it. Art ceases to be an object of aesthetic
broad range of eon- seious life through his coneept of motivation. Motivating contents press on us to varying degrees toward that wbieh they motivate, binding analytically distinct mental acts into experiential wholes in virtue of a felt-belongingness. The motiva- tion relation itself does not
us with good reasons to exercise our right to end our lives at will. Quite the contrary, by assuming that in end-of-life situations it is sometimes more dignified to commit suicide than to continue living, we express a morally dubious attitude of contempt to other people. In short, although we have a
DIE? Is it a bad thing to die? H life has lost its meaning, is unbearable, or has somehow been brought to an end, death is not a threat. Death is not a threat to the living person who has lost interest in living. For the person thinking that our task in life is to let go of our ego and instead
6 Results and Recommendations After having discussed a wide variety of arguments for and against life ex- tension in the previous chapters, the time has co me to state the results of this discussion. As one should note, some arguments can count as sound almost without question (Group A) whereas
, well-being and specific good' of the other, allows for the possibility of an unselfish Iove directed towards al/living creatures, a Iove that is shown in the desire to promote their well-being in and of itself, a Iove that is not motivated by anthropocentric 10 Leibniz hirnself appears not to have
disappear slowly, because if it happened too suddenly, he would not know how to adjust: "I am so used to my compulsions that it is hard to imagine a life without OCD." Autonomy as self-determination Healthcare ethics and law have put the patient's right to self-determination on the agenda in recent
the moral stance. The moral stance is a person's capacity and enduring motivation to recognize common goods, to accept moral demands and to respect other person's happiness-conducive interests. People have various motivating reasons for moral actions, such as, for example, the interest in
processes of commodification which fuel rapid transformations of the city. I also stress that increasing the levels of sophistication, required of individuals in order to participate in contemporary urban life, generates a phenomenon of interpassivity which adversely affects the civic agency of urban